WORK-IN-PROGRESS (JANUARY 2, 2021) PARALLEL CHART FOR

Chapter 74 — Philosophies of Life

of *Theory and Practice of Psychiatry* (1936)

by William S. Sadler, M.D.

Sources for Chapter 74, in the order in which they appear

(1) *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition Unabridged* (G. & C. Merriam Company, Publishers, Springfield, Mass. 1958)

Note: Thanks to Merritt Horn, who helped me cross-check the definitions in my 1958 edition with his 1936 edition. Apart from one word ('duty'), the definitions were identical. The definition of 'duty' cited in the chart is from the 1936 edition.

(2) Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy* (Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1933)

(3) Joseph Herschel Coffin, Ph.D., *Personality in the Making* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1923)

(4) Edited by George P. Adams and Wm. Pepperell Montague, *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements,* ***Vol. I*** (New York: Russell & Russell 1930)

(5) Edited by Howard C. Warren, *Dictionary of Psychology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934)

(6) Albert Einstein, John Dewey, Sir James Jeans, *et al., Living Philosophies: A Series of Intimate Private Credos* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1931)

(7) William De Witt Hyde, *The Five Great Philosophies of Life* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911)

(8) Edited by George P. Adams and Wm. Pepperell Montague, *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements,* ***Vol. II*** (New York: Russell & Russell 1930)

Note: This book contains two essays, one by Rogers and one by Santayana, which were used in a section of Paper 101 of the Urantia Book.

(9) John Morris Dorsey, M.S., M.D., *The Foundations of Human Nature: The Study of the Person* (New York: Longman, Green and Co., 1935)

Note: This book is a source for a section in Paper 19 of the Urantia Book.

Key

(a) Green indicates where a source author (or previous Sadler book) first appears, or where he/she reappears.

(b) Yellow highlights most parallelisms.

(c) Tan highlights parallelisms not occurring on the same row, or parallelisms separated by yellowed parallelisms.

(d) An underlined word or words indicates where the source and Sadler pointedly differ from each other.

(e) Pink indicates passages where Sadler specifically shares his own experiences, opinions, advice, etc.

(f) Light blue indicates passages which strongly resemble something in the Urantia Book, or which allude to the Urantia phenomenon. Source authors of the UB are also blue-highlighted.

(g) Red indicates an obvious error on Sadler's part, brought about, in most cases, by miscopying or misinterpreting his source.

References added 12 Feb. 2021

74 — PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE

74:0.1 Philosophy has been defined as

phi·los´o·phy ... **2.** ... **c** An integrated and consistent personal attitude toward life or reality, or toward certain phases of it, especially if this attitude is expressed in beliefs or in principles of conduct; ... (*Webster's* 1842).

"an integrated and consistent personal attitude toward life, or reality."

The majority of psychiatric patients are endeavoring to meet the trying and perplexing situations of complicated modern life without a clear-cut philosophy of living. Some have such a philosophy, but it is usually more or less nebulous—uncrystallized.

INTRODUCTION (Durant 1)

Specifically, philosophy means and includes five fields of study and discourse:

Academic philosophy is commonly thought of as including five realms:

logic, esthetics, ethics, politics, and metaphysics (D 3-4).

logic, esthetics, ethics, politics, and metaphysics.

It is not my intention to discuss them but only to consider the *philosophies of living*—the motivation and activation of human lives—the technics of living and the goals of mortal striving.

74:0.2 In carrying out a program of real psychic reconstruction of mental, nervous, and emotional patients,

[*Note:* See endnote no. 1, re Coffin's comments on "An Adequate Philosophy of Life".]

the basic purpose of the regimen must be to aid these patients in acquiring an effective and consistent philosophy of life.[1]

Certain types of fairly normal individuals, men and women who have been so fortunate as to inherit a reasonably well-stabilized nervous system, may proceed through life with a sort of crazy-quilt philosophy, but those who are suffering from emotional instability, social mal-adjustment, and other neuroticisms must possess themselves of a fairly well rounded-out philosophy of life that can serve as a centerpiece around which their personalities may be more effectively unified.

"INTRODUCTION," by Professor George Herbert Palmer (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I* 135)

James has admirably defined philosophy as the obstinate attempt to think clearly, and nowhere is such obstinacy more needed than for purging one's judgement from personal bias (P 134-35).

James defined philosophy as "the obstinate attempt to think clearly."

74:0.3 No scheme of psycho-therapeutics is going to prove permanently beneficial to the average neurotic unless a philosophy of life is formulated. To help his patients develop such a *personal credo* should be one of the main objectives of the psychiatrist; such a scheme for living will prove far more beneficial than many weary hours of psychic probing for sex slivers with all of its concomitant (and many times wholly irrelevant) discussion of "penis envy," "castration complex," "anal character," and "libido displacement." And in this connection let me reiterate—the psychiatrist must ever be on the lookout for the tendency to project his own views into the patient's clinical picture.

[!]

[*Compare: Charcot* revived these teachings [*i.e.,* Braid's idea of suggestion in the treatment of mental and nervous disorders] later, little realizing that many of the symptoms which he pointed out he had himself created by his own suggestion. *Bernheim*, of the Nancy School, was the first to reveal that many of the former symptoms believed to be a part of hysteria were, in reality, produced by suggestion ... (*TPoP* 8).]

74:0.4 It is indeed interesting to review Charcot's early experiments with hysteria and his classic description of this phenomenon, but later investigators discovered that he was projecting his own concepts, by the subtle though unconscious practice of suggestion, into the clinical picture. Subsequent observers did not find hysterics behaving as did Charcot.

I believe that fifty or seventy-five years from now psychiatrists will look back upon the present psychoanalytic vogue in a similar manner; that is, they will perceive that much of the sex flavor characterizing the psychoanalytic technic was injected into the picture because of the firm faith, almost religious, which so many psychoanalysts have in Freudian postulates.

74:0.5 What must a personal credo do for a patient to merit the designation of a *philosophy of life?* It should at least markedly contribute to his well-being in four directions:

74:0.6 1. The maintenance of health.

74:0.7 2. The realization of happiness.

74:0.8 3. The augmentation of efficiency.

74:0.9 4. The unification of personality.

74:0.10 Any philosophy of life which accomplishes these results is certainly worthy of the name. Many patients possess worthy latent credos. They are fearful to practice what they believe, but they need only to be helped to broaden and crystallize their philosophies

in order to realize that they already possess fairly efficient personal credos.

74:0.11 As a prelude to the discussion of philosophies of life, it may prove helpful to present the following definitions of the better known and more widely recognized philosophies:

Classification and Definitions

74:0.12 1. Hedonism— Epicureanism

hedonism = 1. the ethical theory which is based on the assumption that personal pleasure is the standard for human behavior and conduct; 2. the psychological theory that men act so as to attain pleasant and avoid unpleasant feeling (*DoP* 122).

74:0.13 **Hedonism.**—The assumption that personal pleasure is

he´don·ism ... **1**. *Ethics.* The doctrine that pleasure is the sole or chief good in life

the sole or chief good in life

and the standard for human conduct;

and that moral duty is fulfilled in the gratification of pleasure-seeking instincts and dispositions (*Webster's* 1155).

that moral duty is fulfilled in the gratification of pleasure-seeking propensities.

The theory that men act to attain pleasure and avoid unpleasant feelings.

The quest for selfish comfort.

Ep´i·cu·re´an·ism ... **1**. ... Epicureanism is mainly identified with the ethical doctrines of Epicurus, who taught that pleasure is the only good and the end of all morality.

74:0.14 **Epicureanism.**—Pleasure as the only good and the end of all morality.

The life of pleasure, however, to be genuine, must be a life of prudence, honor, and justice,

But such a life of pleasure must embrace prudence, honor, justice.

and a man's happiness is properly attained by taking away from his desires.

Happiness is attained by lessening desires.

SOURCE

Cf. HEDONISM (*Webster's* 858).

Sto´i·cism ... **2**. [*not cap.*] The principle or practice of showing indifference to pleasure or pain; impassiveness; repression of feeling (*Webster's* 2481).

Sto´ic ... **1**. A member of the school of philosophy founded by Zeno about 308 B.C. ...

The Stoics were pantheists,

teaching that the world reveals itself as the embodiment of a divine mind (*Webster's* 2481).

self-control = 1. the ability of an individual to repress emotional expression

and to guide his own behavior appropriately in social situations; ... (*DoP* 244).

Ar´is·to·te´li·an·ism ... III. *Ethics.* (1) The supreme good is happiness, which consists in an activity in accordance with virtue—in a complete life.

Human virtue particularly consists in the realization and exercise of man's rational nature, which is his approximation to the divine.

(2) In action, the rational aim is the "golden mean" which lies between opposed extremes, as courage between cowardice and recklessness, or munificence between miserliness and profligate extravagance (*Webster's* 148).

(The later concept of Epicureanism is quite synonymous with hedonism.)

74:0.15 2. Stoicism—Heroic Self-control

74:0.16 **Stoicism.**—The practice of showing indifference to pleasure or pain; impassiveness, repression of feeling,

courageous endurance.

The Zeno school of philosophy,

pantheistic materialism.

Universe reveals itself as embodiment of a divine mind.

74:0.17 **Heroic Self-Control.**—The ability of an individual to repress emotional expression

and behave appropriately in life situations.

Extraordinary self-discipline.

74:0.18 3. Aristotle's "Golden Mean"

74:0.19 **Aristotelianism.**—That the supreme good is happiness in activities in accordance with virtue—a complete life.

Virtue consists in the exercise of man's rational nature, which is his approximation to the divine.

In action, the rational aim is the "golden mean," lying between opposed extremes as courage lies between cowardice and recklessness.

74:0.20 4. Duty—Moral Obligation

du´ty ... **2**. That which a person is bound by moral obligation to do, or refrain from doing; that which one ought to do (*Webster's* 802).

74:0.21 **Duty.**—That which a person is bound by moral obligation to do or refrain from doing; that which one *ought* to do.

duty = ... 2. an individual's interpretation of suitable conduct

The individual's concept of suitable conduct in the presence of life's situations

as determined by his conscience or conception of moral relations (*DoP* 86).

as determined by his interpretation of moral relations.

moral judgment = a judgment concerned with distinctions between right and wrong, or with evaluating specific acts as right or wrong (*DoP* 171).

74:0.22 **Moral Obligation.**—A judgement arrived at as distinguishing between right and wrong;

the recognition of personal duty.

5. Idealism—Platonism

i·de´al·ism ... **2**. The practice of forming ideals or of living under their influence; ...

74:0.23 **Idealism.**—The practice of living according to one's ideals.

74:0.24 1. **Metaphysical Idealism.**—

1. *Philos.* ... **a** Theory which regards reality as essentially spiritual or the embodiment of mind or reason;—called ***metaphysical idealism***. Metaphysical idealisms are of two main types, that which merely affirms the dominance of the ideal element in reality (as Aristotelianism, Augustinianism, Platonism),

a. *Greek idealism:* Affirmation of a dominance of the ideal in reality.

and that which asserts that the intrinsic nature and essence of reality is consciousness or reason (as Hegelianism) ... (*Webster's* 1236).

idealism = 1. ... (*b*) that values have a cosmic significance and are discovered, not invented, by man; ...

That values have a cosmic significance; they are discovered, not invented, by man.

b. *Berkeleianism:* Reality is essentially spiritual—mind.

SOURCE

[**idealism** (1) includes the following types: (*a*) *subjective* i. = that the world exists only as an order of ideas in a society of minds (Berkeley, Ward);

(*b*) *objective,* or *absolute* i. (Hegel) = that it consists (not only as known to us, but in itself) of *ideas* belonging to universal Mind (an impersonal rational order);

and that logical structure and values (moral, esthetic, and religious) possess in it objective reality; ...] (*DoP* 129).

i·de´al·ism ... **1**. *Philos.* ... **b** Theory which identifies reality with perceptibility

or denies the possibility of knowing anything except psychical reality;—called ***epistemological idealism.***

Epistemological idealisms proceed from the affirmation that the mental life alone is knowable, either to a dogmatic dualism (as Cartesianism, Lockianism), which in metaphysics results in realism, or to a subjective idealism in metaphysics (as Berkeleianism), or to solipsism or skepticism (as Humism). Kant terms his own system ... ***transcendental idealism***; ... (*Webster's* 1236).

dualism = the theory that reality consists of two different, relatively independent substances; more specifically, the assumption that psychic and physical phenomena are both real but are fundamentally different in nature (*DoP* 85).

Lock´i·an·ism ... Locke denies the existence of innate ideals and asserts that the mind originally resembles a blank tablet.

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The world exists as an order of ideas in a society of mind.

c. *Hegelianism:* Intrinsic nature of reality is consciousness;

self-existent ideas belong to the universal mind.

That moral and religious values possess objective reality.

74:0.25 2. **Epistemological Idealism.**—

a. *Psychic dominance:* Identification of reality with perceptibility.

We can only know psychic reality.

b. *Cartesianism:* Dogmatic dualism—

the doctrine that reality consists of two different and independent substances—psychic and physical.

c. *Lockianism:* The denial of the existence of innate ideas—mind originally resembles a blank tablet.

All our knowledge comes originally from experience; that is, from sense perception and from reflection upon the relations of apprehended ideas ... (*Webster's* 1450).

Knowledge is derived from experience—sense perception and reflection.

Hum´ism ... The doctrines or methods of the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76), esp. his philosophical skepticism,

d. *Humism*—skepticism:

according to which he restricted human knowledge to experience of ideas and impressions

Human knowledge is restricted to the experience of ideas and impressions,

and denied the possibility of obtaining any ultimate verification of their truth or falsehood (*Webster's* 1213).

but the ultimate verification of their truth or falsehood is impossible.

solipsism = a world-view of the extreme idealistic type, according to which the universe consists solely of the individual in question and his own experiences. [Cf. idealism.] (*DoP* 255)

74:0.26 3. **Solipsism.**—The extreme idealism which teaches that the universe consists solely of a given individual and his own experience.

74:0.27 4. **Transcendental Idealism.**—

tran·scend´ent ... **2**. *Philos.* ... *Kantianism,* beyond the limits of all possible experience and hence beyond knowledge; ... (*Webster's* 2689).

The transcendental experience—going beyond experience—beyond knowledge;

idealism = ... (*c*) *transcendental,* or *critical* I. (Kant) = that *a priori* conditions of experience determine the possibility of objects of experience (*DoP* 129).

that a priori conditions of experience determine the possibility of objects of experience. Kant.

74:0.28 5. **Platonism.**—

Pla´to·nism ... **1**. ... IV. The right life is one which is directed by reason, but in which the necessary appetitive functions are performed with pleasure.

The right life is the one directed by reason, but in which the necessary appetitive functions are performed with pleasure;

Such pleasures of the body, however, are subordinated to pleasures of the mind and particularly to contemplation of that beauty and perfection represented by the ideas, to which the rational soul is akin (*Webster's* 1885).

such pleasures, however, are subordinated to those of the mind, more particularly to the contemplation of that beauty and perfection represented by the ideas to which the rational soul is akin.

The lower must be dominated by the higher.

74:0.29 6. Realism—Presentationalism

re´al·ism ... **1**. *Philos.* **a** The doctrine that universals exist outside the mind;

74:0.30 Belief that universals exist outside the mind;

the conception that what a general or abstract term names is an independent and unitary reality or essence. This doctrine, first formulated by Plato, is often called ***logical realism***... (*Webster's* 2072).

conception that abstract terms symbolize independent reality.

realism = 1. a term applied to several types of world-view,

Applied to several types of philosophic thought

all of which emphasize the independent reality, or objectivity, of the experienced world, as contr. w. views that emphasize its subjective character; ... (*DoP* 224).

which recognize the independent reality—objectivity—of the experienced world.

74:0.31 1. **Logical Realism.**—The doctrines of realism as first taught by the Greeks.

74:0.32 2. **Epistemological Realism.**—

re´al·ism ... **1**. *Philos.* ... **b** The conception that objects of sense perception (and, sometimes, of cognition in general) are real in their own right, existing independently of their being known or related to mind;—often called ***epistemological realism*****;** it is opposed to *idealism* (*Webster's* 2072).

Objects of sense perception are real in their own right—exist independently of being known by the mind.

realism = ... [In the modern use **realism** (1) includes the following types of view, distg. according to the basis for accepting the theory: (*a*) **naive r.** = that knowledge of the objective world arises immediately from direct awareness of objects;

74:0.33 3. **Naïve Realism.**—Knowledge of the objective world arises immediately from direct awareness of such objects.

(*b*) **critical r.** = that this knowledge arises only through the selective and critical elaboration of the data of consciousness;

74:0.34 4. **Critical Realism.**—Knowledge of objects only arises only through the selective and critical elaboration of the data of consciousness.

(*c*) **empirical r.** (Kant) = that the objects which constitute the physical (phenomenal) world can be directly experienced, subject to the a priori conditions of all experience. Syn **presentationism** ... **]** (*DoP* 224).

74:0.35 5. **Empirical Realism.**—Objects of the physical (phenomenal) world can be directly experienced, subject to the a priori conditions of all experiences. Kant.

[See 74:6.4, below.]

74:0.36 6. **The "New Realism."**—In 1912 a group of American philosophers put forth a declaration of principles called the "new realism,"

[*Note: The New Realism: Coöperative Studies in Philosophy* featured essays by Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and Edward Gleason Spaulding, none of which fit Sadler's description.]

which gave recognition to the reality of many things psychic, moral, and spiritual that had theretofore been denied by some of the older schools of realism.

74:0.37 7. Humanism—Altruism

74:0.38 **Humanism.**—Ideals of human progress,

hu´man·ism ... **4**. [*cap.*] A contemporary cult or belief calling itself religious but substituting faith in man for faith in God.

the substitution of faith in man for faith in God,

Humanism is faith in the supreme value and self-perfectibility of human personality. *C. F. Potter* (*Webster's* 1212)

belief in the supreme value and self-perfectibility of human personality.

al´tru·ism ... Regard for, and devotion to, the interests of others as an ethical principle;—opposed to *egoism* or *selfishness* (*Webster's* 78).

74:0.39 **Altruism.**—Regard for, and devotion to, the interests of others—unselfishness.

74:0.40 8. Optimism—Cosmic Adjustment

op´ti·mism ... **1**. *Philos.* **a** Originally, the name applied to Leibnitz's doctrine that the world is the best possible world, based on the argument that God ... being all good, must choose the best.

74:0.41 **Optimism.**—Belief that the world is the best possible since God, being all-good, must choose the best.

b The doctrine or opinion that reality is essentially good, completely good, or as good as it conceivably could be.

Reality must be essentially good;

c The doctrine that the goods of life overbalance the pain and evil of it, that life is preponderantly good (*Webster's* 1711).

the good of life overbalances the evil—life is preponderantly good.

optimism = that attitude of an individual toward the social organization or life in general, which emphasizes the good and is hopeful regarding the trend of social evolution (*DoP* 187).

The attitude toward life which emphasizes the good and is hopeful regarding evolutionary trends.

74:0.42 **Cosmic Adjustment.**—

cos´mic ... **1**. ... imbued with a sense of magnitude and order; expansively vast, catholic, and grandiose; as, *cosmic* emotion (*Webster's* 601).

Imbued with a sense of magnitude and order; expansively vast, catholic, grandiose. Cosmic insight.

[See 74:8.5, below.]

"Accepting the universe."

Optimism controlled by reflective reason and disciplined by scientific judgment.

74:0.42 9. Self-Realization—Goal Pursuit

74:0.43 1. **Skill**—special ability—artistic.

74:0.44 2. **Discovery**—research—scientist.

74:0.45 3. **Adventure**—thrills—lures.

74:0.46 4. **Invention**—mixed motives.

74:0.47 5. **Ambition**—power.

74:0.48 6. **Glory**—adulation.

74:0.49 7. **Security**—leisure.

74:0.50 8. **Reform**—self-sacrifice.

74:0.51 9. **Scholarship**—distinction.

74:0.52 10. **Nobility**—profound and idealistic self-regard.

74:0.53 11. **Pursuit of Philosophy**.

74:0.54 10. Supreme Authority—Loyalty

74:0.55 1. **Home**—parental devotion.

74:0.56 2. **State**—patriotism

74:0.57 3. **Race**—biologic integrity.

74:0.58 4. **Occupation**—professional humor.

74:0.59 5. **Church**—unquestioning faith.

74:0.60 11. Divine Sonship—God-Consciousness

74:0.61 1. Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man.

74:0.62 2. Jesus' concept: Doing the Father's will—loving service.

74:0.63 3. Salvation and survival—belief in personal immortality.

74:0.64 4. The philosophy of the supremacy of love.

74:0.65 12. Mixed Philosophies—Composite Credos

74:0.66 Any and all types of incomplete, combined, and modified philosophies.

Probably one-half of adults give expression to two or more of these philosophies of living when they undertake to state their personal credos.

74:0.67 13. Negativistic Philosophies

pes´si·mism ... **1**. *Philos.* **a** The doctrine or opinion that reality is essentially evil, completely evil, or as evil as it conceivably could be.

74:0.68 1. **Pessimism.**—Belief that reality is essentially evil;

b The doctrine that the evils of life overbalance the happiness it affords, that life is preponderantly evil....

that life is preponderantly evil—evil overbalances happiness.

3. An inclination to ... anticipate the worst possible outcome; a gloomy or despairing temperament (*Webster's* 1830).

To anticipate the worst.

pessimism = that attitude toward the social organization, or toward life in general, which emphasizes the elements of discord therein, and despairs of the future of social evolution (*DoP* 198).

The attitude toward life (society) which emphasizes the elements of discord and despairs of the future of social evolution.

cyn´ic ... **1**. [*cap.*] *Philos.* ... The Cynics taught that virtue is the only good, and that its essence lies in self-control and independence....

74:0.69 2. **Cynicism.**—Virtue is the only good; essence lies in self-control and independence.

2. One who ... believes that human conduct is motivated wholly by self-interest (*Webster's* 657).

Later: belief that human conduct is selfishly motivated.

cynic = an individual who questions the actuality of ideals

Questions the actuality of ideals.

and therefore depreciates the motives underlying every beneficent act (*DoP* 68).

Depreciates the purpose underlying every beneficent act.

fa´tal·ism ... **1**. The doctrine that all things are subject to fate, or that their occurrence is necessitated by the nature of things or by the fixed and inevitable decree of arbiters of destiny, such as the Fates (*Webster's* 922).

74:0.70 3. **Fatalism.**—The doctrine that all things occur because of the fixed and inevitable decree of the arbiters of destiny;

fatalism = the doctrine which holds that all the acts of man are inevitably predestined (*DoP* 103).

that all the acts of man are inevitably predetermined.

de·ter´·min·ism ... **1**. *Philos*. The doctrine that all acts of the will result from causes which determine them. Determinism characteristically denies the reality of alternative modes of action but may maintain that the will is free in the sense of being uncompelled ... (*Webster's* 711).

74:0.71 4. **Determinism.**—Belief that all acts of will result from predetermined causes.

determinism = the theory or working principle according to which all phenomena are considered as necessary consequents of antecedent conditions. [Distg. fr. **mechanism,** which asserts that the causal connection is in all cases ultimately a matter of the displacement of masses ...] (*DoP* 74).

All phenomena are regarded as resulting from antecedent conditions.

Admits free will in the sense of being uncompelled.

mech´a·nism ... **4**. *Philos, Psychol. & Biol. ...* **b** The doctrine that natural processes, and esp. the processes of life, are mechanically determined and capable of explanation by the laws of physics and chemistry (*Webster's* 1525).

74:0.72 5. **Mechanism.**—Belief that natural processes—life—are mechanically determined, are capable of explanation by the laws of physics and chemistry.

Asserts that the causal connection is in all cases ultimately a matter of the displacement of masses.

materialism = 1. the theory that matter is the only ultimate reality;

74:0.73 6. **Materialism.**—Theory that matter is the only ultimate reality.

2. the view which regards the body, more especially the brain, as the *substratrum* of the psychic processes, which are ultimately material products. W 160

The brain is the reality of psychic processes.

ma·te´ri·al·ism ... **1**. *Philos.* **a** Any theory which considers the facts of the universe to be sufficiently explained by the existence and nature of matter; esp. atomism (*Webster's* 1514).

Atomism—the universe is wholly material.

1. Hedonism—Epicureanism

74:1.1 Hedonism is probably the best term with which to designate the twentieth century manifestations, with all their modern accompaniment of thrill-seeking, of the older Epicurean philosophy of life. In all fairness we must admit that there have been and now are two vastly differing concepts of Epicurean doctrine: One that is purely sensuous and another which takes account of desirable levels of thinking and acting which border on both stoicism and Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, the upshot of all this Hedonistic concept of living consists in the *pursuit of pleasure.* The Hedonistic motivation is summed up in "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die."

74:1.2 There is, of course, a vast difference between the ultra-Hedonistic technic of living practiced by many of the careless, free-love Hedonistic youth of the postwar period and those philosophies of living advocated by higher minded Epicureans,

[See Hyde 9-10 for Horace; 74:1.18 for Stevenson; 74:12.15 for Mill.]

such as *Horace, Mill,* and *Stevenson.*

XV: GEORGE JEAN NATHAN (Nathan, in *Living Philosophies* 222)

In a hedonism that combines the forth-rightly egoistic with a modest measure of the altruistic,

Many of the latter-day Hedonists are prone to admit a good deal of altruism with their Epicureanism.

that governs its pleasures partly by intellect and partly by emotion—

They provide for some check upon the indulgence of pleasure by intellectual guidance and emotional control.

depending upon the vagaries and humors of the occasion—

and that foams effervescently in the wake of work serious and painstakingly done, I believe above all other beliefs (N 222).

74:1.3 Some Hedonists believe in working hard while they are on the job and then in filling the following hours of recreation with an effervescent indulgence in pleasure

which is only limited by threats of immediate incompetency for one's work or threats of ill health in the long run.

[GEORGE JEAN NATHAN is the author of a long series of critical works, most of them dealing with the drama. His most recent volume is entitled *Testament of a Critic* (*Living Philosophies* 333).]

74:1.4 Recently a well-known dramatic critic,

in narrating his Hedonistic credo, stated that

To me, pleasure and my own personal happiness—only infrequently collaborating with that of others—

"pleasure and my own personal happiness . . .

are all I deem worth a hoot.

are all that I deem worth a whoop."

It would make me out a much finer and noble person, I duly appreciate, to say that the happiness and welfare of all mankind were close to my heart, that nothing gave me more soulful happiness than to make others happy and that I would gladly sacrifice every cent I have in the world, together with maybe a leg, to bring a little joy to the impoverished and impaired survivors of the late Afridi raids in India,

He admits his fellows might think him a more noble person if he expressed more of an interest in the welfare of mankind,

but I have difficulty in being a hypocrite (N 222-23).

but he frankly refuses to indulge in any such hypocritical pronouncements.

SOURCE

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74:1.5 But there is no question that Hedonism can become a more or less effective philosophy of life. Certain types of individuals, particularly extravertish youths, can so persistently and enthusiastically pursue the "pleasure principle" that it serves the purpose of engrossing their attention, occupying their time, while satisfying the personality drive to do something—"go places and do things." At least for the time being, such insistent and feverish activity constitutes an effective, even if unworthy, nucleus around which personality can be more or less successfully integrated—unified.

I: THE EPICUREAN PURSUIT OF PLEASURE (Hyde 1)

I. SELECTION FROM THE EPICUREAN SCRIPTURES (Hyde 1)

[contd] EPICUREANISM is so simple a philosophy of life that it scarcely needs interpretation.

74:1.6 Epicureanism as a philosophy of life is so well understood that it hardly requires discussion,

In fact, as the following citations show, it was originally little more than a set of directions for living "the simple life," with pleasure as the simplifying principle (H 1).

The best way to understand Epicureanism, however, is to let Epicurus and his disciples speak for themselves (H 1).

but it may be well to allow *Epicurus* and his disciples to present their concept of living in their own words.

First the master, though unfortunately he is not so good a master of style as many of his disciples, shall speak. The gist of Epicurus's teaching is contained in the following passages:

In advocating this "simple life," the founder says:

"The end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear; and when once we have attained this, all the tempest of the soul is laid, seeing that the living creature has not to go to find something that is wanting, or to seek something else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled."

74:1.7 The end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear; and when once we have attained this, all the tempest of the soul is laid, seeing that the living creature has not to go to find something that is wanting, or to seek something else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. . . .

"Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. From it is the commencement of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back, and make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing."

Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. From it is the commencement of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back, and make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. . . .

"When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasure of the prodigal, or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood by some who are either ignorant and prejudiced for other views or inclined to misinterpret our statements.

When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasure of the prodigal, or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood by some who are either ignorant and prejudiced for other views or inclined to misinterpret our statements.

By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking feasts and of revelry, not the enjoyments of the fish and other delicacies of a splendid table, which produce a pleasant life:

By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking feasts and of revelry, not the enjoyments of the fish and other delicacies of a splendid table, which produce a pleasant life:

it is sober reasoning, searching out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which great tumults take possession of the soul."

it is sober reasoning, searching out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which great tumults take possession of the soul. . . .

"Nothing is so productive of cheerfulness as to abstain from meddling, and not to engage in difficult undertakings, nor force yourself to do something beyond your power. For all this involves your nature in tumults" (H 2-3).

Nothing is so productive of cheerfulness as to abstain from meddling, and not to engage in difficult undertakings, nor force yourself to do something beyond your power. For all this involves your nature in tumults.

"And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but oftentimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And oftentimes we consider pains superior to pleasures, and submit to the pain for a long time when it is attended for us with a greater pleasure.

74:1.8 And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but oftentimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And oftentimes we consider pains superior to pleasures, and submit to the pain for a long time when it is attended for us with a greater pleasure.

All pleasure, therefore, because of its kinship with our nature, is a good, but it is not in all cases our choice, even as every pain is an evil, though pain is not always, and in every sense, to be shunned" (H 4).

All pleasure, therefore, because of its kinship with our nature, is a good, but it is not in all cases our choice, even as every pain is an evil, though pain is not always, and in every sense, to be shunned.

"Of all the things which wisdom procures for the happiness of life as a whole, by far the greatest is the acquisition of friendship" (H 6).

74:1.9 Of all the things which wisdom procures for the happiness of life as a whole, by far the greatest is the acquisition of friendship. . . .

[contd] "We ought to look round for people to eat and drink with, before we look for something to eat and drink: to feed without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf" (H 6).

We ought to look round for people to eat and drink with before we look for something to eat and drink; to feed without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf.

"The first duty of salvation is to preserve our vigor and to guard against the defiling of our life in consequence of maddening desires."

74:1.10 The first duty of salvation is to preserve our vigor and to guard against the defiling of our life in consequence of maddening desires. . . .

"Accustom thyself in the belief that death is nothing to us, for good and evil are only where they are felt, and death is the absence of all feeling: therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes enjoyable the mortality of life, not by adding to years an illimitable time but by taking away the yearning after immortality.

Accustom thyself in the belief that death is nothing to us, for good and evil are only where they are felt, and death is the absence of all feeling: therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes enjoyable the mortality of life, not by adding to years an illimitable time but by taking away the yearning after immortality.

For in life there can be nothing to fear, to him who has thoroughly apprehended that there is nothing to cause fear in what time we are not alive. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect.

For in life there can be nothing to fear to him who has thoroughly apprehended that there is nothing to cause fear in what time we are not alive. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in prospect.

Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present causes only a groundless pain by the expectation thereof. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are death is not yet, and when death comes, then we are not. It is nothing then, either to the living or the dead, for it is not found with the living, and the dead exist no longer" (H 7-8).

Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present causes only a groundless pain by the expectation thereof. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not yet, and when death comes, then we are not. It is nothing then, either to the living or the dead, for it is not found with the living, and the dead exist no longer.

[See 74:1.6, above.]

74:1.11 Epicurus was not so good at rhetoric as some of his disciples,

[contd] These words of the master, given with no attempt to reconcile their apparent inconsistencies, convey very fairly the substance of his teaching, including both its excellences and its deep defects (H 8).

but the foregoing selections from his writings indicate the trend of his philosophy.

For a lesson from the new Epicurean testament we cannot do better than turn to the sensible pages of Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics" (H 10).

74:1.12 Latter-day interpretations of Epicureanism is perhaps best presented in *Herbert Spencer's* "Data of Ethics."* [*Spencer, Herbert: Data of Ethics, Williams and Northgate, London, 1907.] He says:

[contd] "The pursuit of individual happiness within those limits prescribed by social conditions is the first requisite to the attainment of the greatest general happiness.

74:1.13 The pursuit of individual happiness within those limits prescribed by social conditions is the first requisite to the attainment of the greatest general happiness.

To see this it needs but to contrast one whose self-regard has maintained bodily well-being with one whose regardlessness of self has brought its natural results; and then to ask what must be the contrast between two societies formed of two such kinds of individuals (H 10-11).

To see this it needs but to contrast one whose self-regard has maintained bodily well-being with one whose regardlessness of self has brought its natural results; and then to ask what must be the contrast between two societies formed of two such kinds of individuals.

[contd] "Bounding out of bed after an unbroken sleep, singing or whistling as he dresses, coming down with beaming face ready to laugh on the smallest provocation, the healthy man of high powers, conscious of past successes and, by his energy, quickness, resource, made confident of the future, enters on the day's business not with repugnance but with gladness;

74:1.14 Bounding out of bed after an unbroken sleep, singing or whistling as he dresses, coming down with beaming face ready to laugh on the smallest provocation, the healthy man of high powers, conscious of past successes and, by his energy, quickness, resource, made confident of the future, enters on the day's business not with repugnance but with gladness;

and from hour to hour experiencing satisfactions from work effectually done, comes home with an abundant surplus of energy remaining for hours of relaxation.

and from hour to hour experiencing satisfaction from work effectually done, comes home with an abundant surplus of energy remaining for hours of relaxation.

Far otherwise is it with one who is enfeebled by great neglect of self. Already deficient, his energies are made more deficient by constant endeavours to execute tasks that prove beyond his strength, and by the resulting discouragement.

Far otherwise is it with one who is enfeebled by great neglect of self. Already deficient, his energies are made more deficient by constant endeavors to execute tasks that prove beyond his strength and by the resulting discouragement.

Hours of leisure which, rightly passed, bring pleasures that raise the tide of life and renew the powers of work, cannot be utilized: there is not vigour enough for enjoyments involving action, and lack of spirits prevents passive enjoyments from being entered upon with zest. In brief, life becomes a burden.

Hours of leisure which, rightly passed, bring pleasures that raise the tide of life and renew the powers of work, cannot be utilized: there is not vigor enough for enjoyments involving action, and lack of spirits prevents passive enjoyments from being entered upon with zest. In brief, life becomes a burden.

Now if, as must be admitted, in a community composed of individuals like the first the happiness will be relatively great, while in one composed of individuals like the last there will be relatively little happiness, or rather much misery; it must be admitted that conduct causing the one result is good and conduct causing the other is bad" (H 11-12).

Now if, as must be admitted, in a community composed of individuals like the first the happiness will be relatively great, while in one composed of individuals like the last there will be relatively little happiness, or rather much misery; it must be admitted that conduct causing the one result is good and conduct causing the other is bad.

[contd] "He who carries self-regard far enough to keep himself in good health and high spirits, in the first place thereby becomes an immediate source of happiness to those around, and in the second place maintains the ability to increase happiness by altruistic actions.

74:1.15 He who carries self-regard far enough to keep himself in good health and high spirits, in the first place thereby becomes an immediate source of happiness to those around, and in the second place maintains the ability to increase happiness by altruistic actions.

But one whose bodily vigour and mental health are undermined by self-sacrifice carried too far, in the first place becomes to those around a cause of depression, and in the second place renders himself incapable, or less capable, of actively furthering their welfare" (H 12).

But one whose bodily vigor and mental health are undermined by self-sacrifice carried too far, in the first place becomes to those around a cause of depression, and in the second place renders himself incapable, or less capable, of actively furthering their welfare.

[contd] "Full of vivacity, the one is ever welcome. For his wife he has smiles and jocose speeches; for his children stores of fun and play; for his friends pleasant talk interspersed with the sallies of wit that come from buoyancy. Contrariwise, the other is shunned. The irritability resulting now from ailments, now from failures caused by feebleness, his family has daily to bear.

74:1.16 Full of vivacity, the one is ever welcome. For his wife he has smiles and jocose speeches; for his children stores of fun and play; for his friends pleasant talk interspersed with the sallies of wit that come from buoyancy. Contrariwise, the other is shunned. The irritability resulting now from ailments, now from failures caused by feebleness, his family has daily to bear.

Lacking adequate energy for joining in them, he has at best but a tepid interest in the amusements of his children; and he is called a wet blanket by his friends. Little account as our ethical reasonings take note of it, yet is the fact obvious that since happiness and misery are infectious, such regard for self as conduces to health and high spirits is a benefaction to others, and such disregard of self as brings on suffering, bodily or mental, is a malefaction to others" (H 12-13).

Lacking adequate energy for joining in them, he has at best but a tepid interest in the amusements of his children; and he is called a wet blanket by his friends. Little account as our ethical reasonings take note of it, yet is the fact obvious that since happiness and misery are infectious, such regard for self as conduces to health and high spirits is a benefaction to others, and such disregard of self as brings on suffering, bodily or mental, is a malefaction to others.

74:1.17 In perusing these lines from Spencer, one cannot help thinking that he is veering from the Epicurean toward the Aristotelian school of philosophy.

At once the best and the worst rendering of Epicureanism into verse is Fitzgerald's translation of Omar Khayyam.

74:1.18 Perhaps the best and the worst presentation of Epicureanism is found in Fitzgerald's transition of Omar Khayyam.

It is the best because of the frankness with which it draws out to its logical conclusion, in a cynical despair of everything nobler than the pleasure of the moment, the consequences of identifying the self with mere pleasure seeking.

It is best because it is so frank in its cynical despair of everything good or noble,

It is the worst because, instead of presenting Epicureanism mixed with nobler elements, as Walt Whitman and Stevenson do, it gives us the pure and undiluted article as a final gospel of life (H 15-16).

and worst because it presents Epicureanism without the nobler elements which are recognized by such disciples as Walt *Whitman* and *Stevenson.*

II. THE EPICUREAN VIEW OF WORK AND PLAY (Hyde 20)

The Epicurean will regulate his diet, not by the immediate, trivial, short-lived pleasures of taste, though these he will by no means despise,

74:1.19 The Epicurean regulates his diet so as to afford immediate pleasures of taste

but mainly by their permanent effects upon health.

while giving due consideration to permanent influences upon health.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
Wholesome food, and enough of it, daintily prepared and served, he will do his best to obtain.	He seeks plenty of good food, attractively served,
But elaborate and ostentatious feasting he will avoid, as involving too much expense and trouble, and too heavy penalties of disease and discomfort (H 21).	but he disdains ostentatious feasting because it involves too much trouble and expense.
The Epicurean will not lose an hour of needed sleep nor tolerate such an abomination as an alarm clock in his house (H 22).	"The Epicurean will not lose an hour of needed sleep nor tolerate such an abomination as an alarm clock in his house."
III: THE EPICUREAN PRICE OF HAPPINESS (Hyde 29)	
[contd] Whoever contracts his work and expands his play, on Epicurean principles,	74:1.20 The Epicurean strives to contract his labor and expand his leisure—
will of course have common sense enough to cut off hurry and worry altogether.	all the while living free from hurry and worry
Both are sheer waste and wantonness,— the most foolish and wicked things in the whole list of forbidden sins.	since he regards both as highly evil.
The Epicurean will live his life in care-tight, worry-proof compartments; working with all his might while he works; and then cutting it off short; never letting the cares of work intrude on the precious precincts of well-earned leisure,	He seeks to prevent his work from intruding upon his play,
or permitting the strain of remembered or anticipated toil to mar the hours sacred to rest and recreation (H 29).	to keep his toil from marring his leisure.

Epicurus is right, that happiness is up at auction all the time, and sold in lots to suit the purchaser whenever he bids high enough. And the price is not exorbitant: prudence to plan for the simple pleasures that can be had for the asking; resolution to cut off the pleasures that come too high;

He is determined to enjoy the pleasures of living which are not too expensive

determination to amputate our reflections the instant they develop morbid symptoms, ... to live in a self-chosen present from which profitless regret and unprofitable anxieties, projected from the past or borrowed from the future, are absolutely banished (H 32-33).

and to shun those which result in morbid anxieties and mildewing regrets.

It is high time to treat melancholy, depression, gloom, fretfulness, unhappiness, not merely as diseases, but as the inexcusable follies, the intolerable vices, the unpardonable sins which a sane and wholesome Epicureanism pronounces them to be (H 33).

The Epicurean looks upon melancholia, depression, worry, and gloom as inexcusable evil—unpardonable sin.

IV. THE DEFECTS OF EPICUREANISM (Hyde 36)

Epicurus's "free laugh" at those who attempt to fulfil their political duties,

74:1.21 *Epicurus* laughs at those who attempt to meet their social and political obligations.

his quiet ignoring of all interests that lie outside his little circle, or reach beyond the grave, his naïve remark about the intrinsic harmlessness of wrong-doing, provided only the wrong-doer could escape the fear of being caught,

He makes light of wrongdoing provided the wrongdoer escapes fear of being caught.

must have made us aware that there are heights of nobleness, depths of devotion, lengths of endurance, breadths of sympathy altogether foreign to this easy-going, pleasure-seeking view of life (H 36-37).

His philosophy of life is essentially selfish and is stranger to such virtues as devoted love, noble sympathy, stoic endurance, or supreme loyalty.

The fundamental defect of Epicureanism is its false definition of personality.

74:1.22 The chief error of Epicureanism is its inadequate concept of personality—

According to Epicurus the person is merely a bundle of appetites and passions;

the idea that a human being is merely a "bundle of appetites and passions,"

and the gratification of these is made synonymous with the satisfaction of himself.

that self-gratification is the chief purpose of living.

But gratifications are short; while appetites are long. The result is that which Schopenhauer has so conclusively pointed out....

Even Schopenhauer discovered the folly of such a philosophy, pointing out that desire is continuous while gratification can be only periodical.

The obvious conclusion from the frequent examination of the Epicurean account-book is that which Schopenhauer so triumphantly demonstrates,—pessimism (H 37-38).

To be entirely frank, the devotees of Omar Khayyam would have to confess that

74:1.23 From Epicurus to Omar Khayyam

it is this note of pessimism, despair, and self-pity, at the sorry contrast of the vast unattainable and the petty attained, which is the secret of his unquestionably fascinating lines.

there runs through this whole philosophy of Hedonism a continuous thread of pessimism, self-pity, and moral despair.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
Here the blasé amusement-seeker finds consolation in the fact that	Sooner or later the intelligent amusement-seeker must awaken to the realization that
a host of other people are also yielding to the temptation to bury the unwelcome consciousness of a self they cannot satisfy in wine, or any other momentary sensuous titillation that will conceal the sense of their spiritual failure—	enduring satisfaction cannot be found in the exclusive pursuit of wine, women, and song—
failure, however, which they are glad to be assured is shared by so many that the sense of it has been dignified by the name of a philosophy and sung by a poet (H 38-39).	notwithstanding that such a career has attained the pseudodignity of being designated a philosophy of life.
[contd] Pleasure cannot be sought directly with success;	74:1.24 Lasting pleasure is never secured by direct seeking;
for pleasure comes indirectly as the effect of causes far higher and deeper and wider than any that are recognised in the Epicurean philosophy. Pleasure comes unsought to those who lose themselves in large intellectual, artistic, social, and spiritual interests.	it rather comes unsought to those who attain the larger and enduring realms of genuine self-realization on ever-progressing levels of personality expansion and unification.
But such noble losing of self without thought of gain is explicitly excluded from the consistent Epicurean creed (H 39).	Epicureanism is incompatible with socialization of personality;
	it fosters selfishness, sensuousness, ease, and luxury.
In fact it is only as a parasite on [the] great domestic, social, and political institutions which it does nothing to create or maintain, and much to weaken and destroy, that Epicureanism is even a tolerable account of life. [Etc.] (H 39-40)	Epicureans tend to develop into social parasites,
	moral cynics,

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
As business men these Epicureans are apt to be easy-going, and therefore failures.	easy-going citizens,
As debtors , they are the hardest people in the world from whom to collect a bill.	indifferent debtors,
As creditors or landlords they are the most merciless in their exactions (H 41).	hard-hearted creditors,
	irresponsible parents;
	and all too often life comes to be a bore—
They flit hither and thither where least ennui and most diversion allures.... When they return, if they ever do, to their native town or city, the drudgery of house-keeping has become intolerable, the responsibilities of social life unendurable ... (H 42).	they not infrequently suffer markedly from ennui.
V. AN EXAMPLE OF EPICUREAN CHARACTER (Hyde 46)	
[contd] The clearest example of the shortcomings of Epicureanism is the character of Tito Melema in George Eliot's "Romola."	74:1.25 One of the best examples of the shortcomings of Epicureanism is the characterization of Tito Melema in *George Eliot's* "Romola."
Pleasure and the avoidance of pain are this young Greek's only principles.	Pleasure and the avoidance of pain constitute this young Greek's philosophy of living.
He is "of so easy a conscience that he would make a stepping-stone of his father's corpse."	He is "of so easy a conscience that he would make a stepping-stone of his father's corpse."
"He has a lithe sleekness about him that seems marvellously fitted for slipping into any nest he fixes his mind on" (H 46).	"He has a lithe sleekness about him that seems marvelously fitted for slipping into any nest he fixes his mind on."

"He had an unconquerable aversion to anything unpleasant, even when an object very much loved and admired was on the other side of it" (H 46).

"He had an unconquerable aversion to anything unpleasant, even when an object very much loved and admired was on the other side of it."

2. Stoicism—Heroic Self-Control

II: STOIC SELF-CONTROL BY LAW (Hyde 66)

III. THE STOIC REVERENCE FOR LAW (Hyde 82)

74:2.1 The true Stoic is a reverent believer in a universe regulated by law;

he has a profound veneration for all such regulatory laws.

[*Compare:* He [Thomas] was a good loser (139:8.8).]

He is not only courageous and brave, but he is a "good loser."

I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LAW OF APPERCEPTION (Hyde 66)

Translated into simple everyday terms,

Translated into common language,

this doctrine [of apperception] in its application to the personal life means that

Stoicism becomes a doctrine of personal living which postulates that

the value of any external fact or possession or experience depends on the way in which we take it (H 66-67).

"the value of any external fact or possession or experience depends on the way in which we take it."

Stoicism works this doctrine for all that it is worth. Christian Science and kindred popular cults of the present day

Christian Science and kindred cults

unite this concept with Berkeleian idealism,

are perhaps working it for rather more than it is worth (H 66).

and work both concepts for more than they are really worth.

SOURCE

[See 74:0.16, above.]

Hence whether an external fact is good or evil, depends on how we take it, what we make of it,

the state of mind and heart and will into which it enters as a factor; and that in turn depends, the Stoic tells us, on ourselves, and is under our control (H 69).

The only difference between Stoicism and Christian Science at this point is that Stoicism recognises the material element;

though it does so only to minimise it, and pronounce it indifferent (H 70).

This doctrine that external things never in themselves constitute a mental state; that they are consequently indifferent; that the all-important contribution is made by the mind itself; ...—this is the first and most fundamental Stoic principle (H 71).

II: SELECTIONS FROM THE STOIC SCRIPTURES (Hyde 71)

[contd] First let us listen to Epictetus, the slave, the Stoic of the cottage as he has been called:—

74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY

These doctrines of heroic self-control were formulated and first advocated by *Zeno,* the Stoic.

74:2.2 Whether an external fact is good or evil depends entirely on how we take it—how we react to it—what it really means to us.

External facts are regarded as small factors in the mental state.

The chief difference between Stoicism and Christian Science is that Stoicism recognizes material things,

even though it seeks to minimize them.

74:2.3 The first and fundamentalism doctrine of Stoicism consists in the belief that external things never in themselves constitute a true mental state; that the worth-while qualities of mind are a contribution of the self.

74:2.4 In our study of the Stoic scriptures,

let us first listen to *Epictetus,* the slave, the Stoic of the cottage:

[contd] "Everything has two handles: one by which it may be borne, another by which it cannot.

If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold on the affair by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be borne;

but rather by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you, and thus you will lay hold on it as it is to be borne" (H 71).

74:2.5 Everything has two handles: one by which it may be borne, another by which it cannot.

If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold on the affair by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be borne;

but rather by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you, and thus you will lay hold on it as it is to be borne.

"Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the view they take of things.

Thus death is nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates.

But the terror consists in our notion of death, that it is terrible.

When, therefore, we are hindered or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others but to ourselves; that is, to our views" (H 73).

74:2.6 Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the view they take of things.

Thus death is nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates.

But the terror consists in our notion of death, that it is terrible.

When, therefore, we are hindered or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others but to ourselves; that is, to our views. . . .

"There are things which are within our power, and there are things which are beyond our power..." (H 73).

There are things which are within our power, and there are things which are beyond our power.

In his discourse on tranquillity Epictetus gives us the same counsel.

"Consider, you who about to undergo trial, what you wish to preserve, and in what to succeed. For, if you wish to preserve a mind in harmony with nature, you are entirely safe; everything goes well; you have no trouble on your hands. While you wish to preserve that freedom which belongs to you, and are contented with that, for what have you longer to be anxious?

74:2.7 In his discourse on tranquillity *Epictetus* gives similar counsel:

74:2.8 Consider, you who about to undergo trial, what you wish to preserve, and in what to succeed. For, if you wish to preserve a mind in harmony with nature, you are entirely safe; everything goes well; you have no trouble on your hands. While you wish to preserve that freedom which belongs to you, and are contented with that, for what have you longer to be anxious?

For who is the master of things like these? Who can take them away? If you wish to be a man of modesty and fidelity, who shall prevent you? If you wish not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desires contrary to your principles? to aversions contrary to your opinion? The judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence against you which he thinks formidable; but can he likewise make you receive it with shrinking? Since, then, desire and aversion are in your power, for what have you to be anxious?" (H 75).

For who is the master of things like these? Who can take them away? If you wish to be a man of modesty and fidelity, who shall prevent you? If you wish not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desires contrary to your principles? to aversions contrary to your opinion? The judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence against you which he thinks formidable; but can he likewise make you receive it with shrinking? Since, then, desire and aversion are in your power, for what have you to be anxious?

[contd] Epictetus bids us meet difficulties in the same way. Difficulties are things that show what men are. For the future, in case of any difficulty, remember that God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you against a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be an Olympic conqueror; and this cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more profitable difficulty on his hands than you have, provided you but use it as an athletic champion uses his antagonist" (H 75-76).

74:2.9 Difficulties are things that show what men are. For the future, in case of any difficulty, remember that God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you against a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be an Olympic conqueror; and this cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more profitable difficulty on his hands than you have, provided you but use it as an athletic champion uses his antagonist.

At this point, if not before, we feel that Stoicism

74:2.10 We can hardly refrain from feeling that Stoicism

ignores the noble sentiments of life,

is doing violence to the nobler feelings of our nature,

that it does violence to the finer things of human nature.

and are prepared to break with it (H 76).

It presents splendid concepts of duty but is devoid of all altruistic connotations.

We may be as Stoical as we please in our own troubles and afflictions;

It may possibly be a courageous attitude to cultivate toward one's own troubles and sufferings,

but let us beware how we carry over its icy distinctions into our interpretation of our neighbour's suffering (H 76-77).

but it is hardly a kind attitude to assume toward our neighbor's suffering.

[contd] I have drawn most of my illustrations from Epictetus, because this resignation comes with rather better grace from a poor, lame man,

74:2.11 These stoical sentiments are all the more appropriate when they come from Epictetus, a poor, lame man,

who has been a slave, and who lives on the barest necessities of life,

who has been a slave, and who subsists on the barest necessities.

than from the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, and the wealthy courtier Seneca. Yet the most distinctive utterances of these men teach the same lesson.

But we get the same teachings from the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and the well-to-do Seneca.

Seneca attributes it to his pilot in the famous prayer,

Seneca expresses his philosophy in the famous prayer,

"Oh, Neptune, you may save me if you will; you may sink me if you will; but whatever happens, I shall keep my rudder true."

"Oh, Neptune, you may save me if you will; you may sink me if you will; but whatever happens, I shall keep my rudder true."

Marcus Aurelius says:

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"Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or pain; and let it not unite itself with them, but let it circumscribe itself, and limit those effects to their parts."

74:2.12 Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or pain; and let it not unite itself with them, but let it circumscribe itself, and limit those effects to their parts. . . .

"Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty, and whether dying or doing something else. For it is one of the acts of life,—this act by which we die; it is sufficient, then, in this act also to do well what we have in hand."

Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm if thou art doing thy duty, and whether dying or doing something else. For it is one of the acts of life—this act by which we die; it is sufficient, then, in this act also to do well what we have in hand. . . .

"External things touch not the soul, not in the least degree."

External things touch not the soul, not in the least degree. . . .

"Remember on every occasion which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle: that this is not a misfortune, but to bear it nobly is good fortune" (H 77).

Remember on every occasion which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle: that this is not a misfortune, but to bear it nobly is good fortune.

The most recent prophet of Stoicism is Maurice Maeterlinck.

74:2.13 One of the more recent advocates of Stoicism is *Maurice Maeterlinck.*

In "Wisdom and Destiny," he says:— (H 78)

In "Wisdom and Destiny"* [*Maeterlinck, Maurice: Wisdom and Destiny, translated by A. Sutro, J. H. Nash, San Francisco, 1930.] he says:

[contd] "The event itself is pure water that flows from the pitcher of fate, and seldom has it either savour or perfume or colour. But even as the soul may be wherein it seeks shelter, so will the event become joyous or sad, become tender or hateful, become deadly or quick with life.

74:2.14 The event itself is pure water that flows from the pitcher of fate, and seldom has it either savour or perfume or color. But even as the soul may be wherein it seeks shelter, so will the event become joyous or sad, become tender or hateful, become deadly or quick with life.

To those round about us there happen incessant and countless adventures, whereof every one, it would seem, contains a germ of heroism: but the adventure passes away, and heroic deed there is none. But when Jesus Christ met the Samaritan, met a few children, an adulterous woman, then did humanity rise three times in succession to the level of God" (H 78).

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III. THE STOIC REVERENCE FOR UNIVERSAL LAW (Hyde 82)

[contd] The first half of the Stoic doctrine is that we give our world the colour of our thoughts.

74:2.15 The first half of the Stoic philosophy teaches that we give our environment the color of our thoughts;

The second half of Stoicism is concerned with what these thoughts of ours shall be.

the second half is concerned with the nature of these thoughts.

The first half of the doctrine alone would leave us in crude fantastic Cynicism,— the doctrine out of which the broader and deeper Stoic teaching took its rise (H 82).

The first half leaves us in the clutch of cynicism,

Modern apostles of the essential Stoic principle incline to paint the world in the roseate hues of a merely optional optimism (H 82).

but the modern Stoics are more inclined toward optimism.

74:2.16 The *Apostle Paul,* when depicting his theology, declared that he was "determined to know nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified"; but when he gave expression to his philosophy of living,

[Paul leaned heavily toward Stoicism when he wrote, "I have learned in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content" (121:4.3).]

he uttered a characteristically Stoic sentiment, saying: "I have learned in whatsoever state I am therewith to be content."

The most uncompromising exponent of this second half of the Stoic doctrine in the modern world is Immanuel Kant.

74:2.17 The most effective exponent of this second half of Stoic philosophy is *Immanuel Kant.*

According to him the whole worth and dignity of life turns not on external fortune, nor even on good natural endowments,

He claims that the whole value and meaning of life depend, not on external fortune or advantageous natural endowments,

but on our internal reaction, the reverence of our will for universal law.

but rather on our own internal reaction, the reverence of will for universal law.

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will..." (H 85).

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will."

In Kant Stoicism reaches its climax.

In Kant's teachings, Stoicism reaches its climax;

Law and the will are everything: possessions, even graces are nothing (H 86).

law and the will are everything,

regardless of the associated trans-cendentalism.

IV. THE STOIC SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL (Hyde 87)

[contd] The problem of evil was the great problem of the Stoic,

74:2.18 The *nature of evil* was the great problem of the Stoics

as the problem of pleasure was the problem of the Epicurean.

as the question of pleasure was that of the Epicureans.

To this problem the Stoic gives substantially four answers, with all of which we are already somewhat familiar:— (H 87)

To this problem the Stoic gives substantially three answers:

[contd] First: Only that is evil which we choose to regard as such.

74:2.19 1. Only that is evil which we recognize as such.

To quote Marcus Aurelius once more on this fundamental point:

To quote *Marcus Aurelius:*

"Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay" (H 87).

"Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay."

Second: Since virtue or integrity is the only good, nothing but the loss of that can be a real evil (H 87).

74:2.20 2. As virtue is the only good, nothing short of its loss can be evil.

Third: What seems evil to the individual is good for the whole: and since we are members of the whole is good for us (H 89).

74:2.21 3. That which appears to be evil to the individual may be good for the race.

Fourth: Trial brings out our best qualities, is "stuff to try the soul's strength on," and "educe the man," as Browning puts it.

Again, trouble may disclose our better traits—may develop our stronger natures.

This interpretation of evil as a means of bringing out the higher moral qualities,

This concept of evil as a technic of bringing out higher moral qualities

though not peculiar to Stoicism, was very congenial to their system, and appears frequently in their writings (H 89-90).

runs throughout their teachings.

VI. THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF STOICISM (Hyde 95)

[contd] The Stoics had a genuine religion.

74:2.22 The *early Stoics* had a *real religion.*

The Epicureans, too, had their gods, but they never took them very seriously (H 95).

The Epicureans amused themselves with certain concepts of the gods but never took religion seriously.

But the Stoics conceived a moral nature bordering on the spiritual.

Nowhere outside of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures has adoration breathed itself in more exalted and fervent strains [than in the hymn of Cleanthus, addressed to Zeus] (H 98).

Nowhere outside of the Hebrew and Christian sacred writings do we encounter more exalted concepts of human living.

The chief modern type of Stoicism, however, is Matthew Arnold (H 100).

The leading modern advocate of Stoicism is Matthew *Arnold.*

VIII. THE DEFECTS OF STOICISM (Hyde 106)

It be may well enough to treat things as indifferent, and work them over into such mental combinations as best serve our rational interests.

74:2.23 Stoicism may be an effective technic for meeting nonsocial life situations

since it exhibits may courageous and even noble qualities,

To treat persons in that way, however, to make them mere pawns in the game which reason plays, is heartless, monstrous.

but it is hardly an ideal doctrine for dealing with our fellow mortals.

Human emotions and sentiments are a real part of living, and no philosophy of life can wholly ignore them.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
The affections are as essential to man as is his reason (H 107).	74:2.24 Sentimental feelings and affectionate loyalty are just as much a part of man's real life as are reason and logic,
	and the inherent weakness of Stoic philosophy is that it fails to take cognizance of the reality and indispensability of these more sentimental and spiritual qualities of human experience.
	74:2.25 Someone has called attention to the fact that
I suppose that is why, in all the history of Stoicism, though college girls usually have a period of flirting with the Stoic melancholy of Matthew Arnold, no woman was ever known to be a consistent and steadfast Stoic (H 107).	but few women ever adopt Stoicism as a philosophy of life, albeit occasionally a college girl is found to be more or less devoted to the melancholic Stoicism of Matthew Arnold.
	It would appear that
Stoicism is something of which men, unmarried or badly married men at that, have an absolute monopoly (H 107).	unmarried men or those unfortunately married have more or less of a monopoly of Stoicism.
Its God is fate (H 109).	74:2.26 Fate seems to be the god of the Stoic,
	and there is not much personal consolation or effective help to be had from such a concept in times of real personal trouble and adversity.
Instead of a loving, living will, manifest in the struggle with present conditions, Stoicism sees only an impersonal law, rigid, fixed, fatal, unalterable, unimprovable, uncompanionable (H 109).	The ideal that the universe is merely an aggregation of cold and impersonal laws which operate with the unerring and fatalistic rigidity

may indeed breed a commendable type of courageous devotion to duty, but it robs life of so much that is touchingly beautiful and creatively true.

Its satisfaction is staked on a dead law to be obeyed, not a live will to be loved (H 109).

It deprives the universe of the concept of a supreme and beneficent lawgiver who can be recognized and loved and who can function as a sentimental background and source of the otherwise dead and unalterable laws which, perforce, we must all sooner or later discover and obey.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of Stoicism is that

It has no place for the development of rich and varied individuality in each through intense, passionate devotion to other individuals as widely different as age, sex, training, and temperament can make them (H 109).

it does not provide for those passionate devotions and beautifully loyal friendships which are based upon the appreciation of the qualities of one personality by another personality.

3. Aristotle's Golden Mean

74:3.1 Aristotle's credo of living embodied most of the more excellent features of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Platonism; but this philosopher-moralist went far beyond the doctrines of his predecessors in his concept of human living in relation to reality, in that he elevated their ideas and ideals to levels of moral grandeur and consistent intellectual cohesiveness.

IV: THE ARISTOTELIAN SENSE OF PROPORTION (Hyde 169)

I. ARISTOTLE'S OBJECTIONS TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS (Hyde 169)

In opposition to Epicurus Aristotle says,

"Pleasure is not the good and all pleasures are not desirable..." (H 169).

There are, however, two apparently contradictory teachings about pleasure in Aristotle, and it is a good test of our grasp of his doctrine to see whether we can reconcile them.

First he says,

"In all cases we must be especially on our guard against pleasant things, and against pleasure; for we can scarce judge her impartially.

And so, in our behaviour toward her, we should imitate the behaviour of the old counsellors toward Helen, and in all cases repeat their saying: If we dismiss her, we shall be less likely to go wrong."

"It is pleasure that moves us to do what is base, and pain that moves us to refrain from what is noble" (H 172).

[contd] On the other hand he says:

"The pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must be taken as a test of character. He who faces danger with pleasure, or, at any rate, without pain, is courageous, but he to whom this is painful is a coward. Indeed we all more or less make pleasure our test in judging actions" (H 172).

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SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
Aristotle rejects the Epicurean principle of pleasure;	74:3.6 Nevertheless, Aristotle rejects the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure
because, though a proof that isolated tendencies are satisfied, it is no adequate criterion of the satisfaction of the self as a whole.	because, although specific cravings are gratified, the self as a whole is not satisfied.
He rejects the Stoic principle of conformity to law;	He likewise rejects the Stoic teaching of blind adherence to law
because it fails to recognise the supreme worth of individuality.	because such a conformity neglects to recognize “the supreme worth of individuality.”
He rejects the Platonic principle of subordination of appetites and passions to a supreme good which is above them;	He discounts the Platonic principle of the subordination of appetites and passions to the superior nature which is above them
because he dreads above all things the blight of asceticism,	because he fears above all things “the blight of asceticism”;
and strives for a good which is concrete and practical (H 175).	he aims at the attainment of practical and symmetrical development of character.
Evidently we are now on the track of a principle infinitely more subtle and complex than	74:3.7 We are now encountering a philosophy far more intriguing and immeasurably more satisfying than
anything the pleasure-loving Epicurean, or the formal Stoic, or the transcendental Platonist has ever dreamed of.	the pleasure-loving Epicurean, the courageous Stoic, or even the transcendental Platonist ever imagined.
We are entering the presence of the world’s master moralist;	We are now in the presence of one of the world’s master moralists;
and if we have ever for a moment supposed that either of these previous systems was satisfactory or final, it behooves us now to take the shoes from off our feet, and reverently listen to a voice as much profounder and more reasonable than them all, as they are superior to a senseless appetites and blind passions of the mob (H 176).	and we will do well to give his precepts attentive consideration.

III. RIGHT AND WRONG DETERMINED BY THE END (Hyde 179)

74:3.8 Aristotle taught that

A will that seeks no ends is a will that wills nothing; in other words, no will at all.

a will without a purpose is no will at all.

Whether an act is wrong or right, then, depends on the whole plan of life of which it is a part; on the relation in which it stands to one's permanent interests (H 181).

Whether an act is right or wrong depends entirely on the motivation of its personality.

He regarded

Good honest work, after an ideal plan, to the full measure of his powers, with wise selection of appropriate means, gives each individual his place and rank in the vast workshop wherein the eternal thoughts of God, revealed to men as their several ideals, are wrought out into the actuality of the social, economic, political, æsthetic and spiritual order of the world (H 184).

the ideals of men as a revelation of the eternal thoughts of God.

Do you wish, then, to know precisely where you stand in the scale of personality? Here is the test. How large a section of this world do you care for, in such a vital, responsible way, that are you thinking about its welfare, forming schemes for its improvement, bending your energies toward its advancement? [Etc.] (H 185)

Nobility of personality is proportional to the extent of one's interest in, and labors for, the welfare of one's fellow mortals.

We have, then, clearly in mind Aristotle's first great concept.

74:3.9 We have, then, clearly in mind Aristotle's first great concept.

The end of life, which he calls happiness, he defines as the identification of one's self with some large social or intellectual object,

The end of life, which he calls happiness, is defined as the identification of oneself with some large social or intellectual project

and the devotion of all one's powers to its disinterested service.

and the whole-hearted devotion of all one's power to its unselfish advancement.

So far forth it is Carlyle's gospel of the blessedness of work in a worthy cause.

How similar is all this to Carlyle's doctrine of the blessedness of work in a worthy cause:

"Blessed is he who has found his work; let him ask no other blessedness. He has a work, a life purpose; he has found it, and will follow it.

74:3.10 Blessed is he who has found his work; let him ask no other blessedness. He has a work, a life purpose; he has found it, and will follow it.

The only happiness a brave man ever troubled himself with asking much about was happiness enough to get his work done.

The only happiness a brave man ever troubled himself with asking much about was happiness enough to get his work done.

Whatsoever of morality and of intelligence; what of patience, perseverance, faithfulness of method, insight, ingenuity, energy; in a word, whatsoever of strength the man had in him will lie written in the work he does.

Whatsoever of morality and of intelligence; what of patience, perseverance, faithfulness of method, insight, ingenuity, energy; in a word, whatsoever of strength the man had in him will lie written in the work he does.

To work: why, it is to try himself against Nature and her everlasting unerring laws; these will tell a true verdict as to the man" (H 190).

To work: why, it is to try himself against Nature and her everlasting unerring laws; these will tell a true verdict as to the man.

IV. THE NEED OF INSTRUMENTS (Hyde 191)

[contd] Aristotle's first doctrine, then, is that we must work for worthy ends.

74:3.11 Aristotle first requires that we must strive to attain worthy goals,

The second follows directly from it. We must have tools to work with; means by which to gain our ends.

and then that we must select an appropriate technic of living whereby to attain such worthy ends.

General Gordon, who was something of a Platonist, remarked to Cecil Rhodes, who was a good deal of an Aristotelian,

General Gordon, who was more or less of a Platonist, said to Cecil Rhodes, who was something of an Aristotelian,

that he once had a whole room full of good offered him, and declined to take it.

that he once had a whole room full of gold offered him but declined to take it.

"I should have taken it," replied Mr. Rhodes.

"I should have taken it," replied Mr. Rhodes.

SOURCE

"What is the use of having great schemes if you haven't the means to carry them out?"

As Aristotle says:

"Happiness plainly requires external goods; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to act nobly without some furniture or fortune.

There are many things that can be done only through instruments, so to speak, such as friends and wealth and political influences; and there are some things whose absence takes the bloom off our happiness, as good birth, the blessing of children, personal beauty.

Happiness, then, seems to stand in need of this kind of prosperity" (H 192).

[contd] Now we have two fundamental Aristotelian doctrines.

[Note: Sadler misread Hyde, who stated that the two fundamental doctrines are (1) we must have an an end, and (2) we must have means with which to carry out that end.]

We must have an end, some section of the world which we undertake to mould according to a pattern clearly seen and firmly grasped in our own minds.

Second, we must have instruments, tools, furniture of fortune in the shape of health, wealth, influence, power, friends, business and social and political connections with which to carry out our ends (H 193-94).

V. THE HAPPY MEAN (Hyde 194)

[contd] The third great Aristotelian principle follows directly from these two.

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"What is the use of having great schemes if you haven't the means to carry them out?"

As Aristotle says:

74:3.12 Happiness plainly requires external goods; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to act nobly without some furniture or fortune.

There are many things that can be done only through instruments, so to speak, such as friends and wealth and political influences; and there are some things whose absence takes the bloom off our happiness, as good birth, the blessing of children, personal beauty.

Happiness, then, seems to stand in need of this kind of prosperity.

74:3.13 These are the two basic Aristotelian doctrines,

but their application necessitates that

one should have some goal of destiny—some purpose of achievement.

The third is correlated with these two.

It postulates that

If we are to use instruments for some great end, then the amount of the instruments we want, and the extent to which we shall use them, will obviously be determined by the end at which we aim.

the nature of our goals must determine the type of instruments to be employed and the extent to which they shall be utilized.

We must take just so much of them as will best promote the good.

We must not use more than will effectively accomplish the purpose of our striving.

This is Aristotle's much misunderstood but most characteristic doctrine of the mean (H 194).

This is Aristotle's most misunderstood but most characteristic doctrine of the "golden mean."

[contd] The mean is not midway between zero and the maximum attainable.

But this mean is not midway between the minimum and the maximum attainable.

As Aristotle says, "By the mean relatively to us I understand that which is neither too much nor too little for us; and that is not one and the same for all..." (H 197).

He says: "By the mean relatively to us I understand that which is neither too much nor too little for us; and that is not one and the same for all."

[An ancient critic spoke of [Aristotle] as "moderate to excess" (Durant 102).]

One writer regarded Aristotle as being "moderate to excess."

VI. THE ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUES AND THEIR ACQUISITION (Hyde 199)

Aristotle, to begin with, distinguishes wisdom from prudence. Wisdom is the theoretic knowledge of things as they are, irrespective of their serviceableness to our practical interests....

Prudence comes next; the power to see,

74:3.14 All of this suggests prudence, the ability to discern

not the theoretical relations of men and things to each other, but the practical relationships of men and things to our self-chosen ends (H 200).

practical relationships as well as to perceive theoretical consideration.

Wisdom had a prominent place in Aristotle's philosophy.

And blended with all of this superior concept of the technic of living was a liberal provision for

Temperance,

temperance—

again, is not the repression of lower impulses in the interest of those abstractly higher, as it come to be in the popular interpretations of Platonism, and as it was in Stoicism.

Plato's ideas of the lower impulses' being under the control of the higher urges.

With Aristotle it is the stern and remorseless exclusion of whatever cannot be brought into subjection to my chosen ends, whatever they may be.

Aristotle would courageously reject that which cannot augment the achievement of the chosen goal.

As Stevenson says in true Aristotelian spirit,

Stevenson gave expression to the real spirit of Aristotle's philosophy when he said:

"We are not damned for doing wrong: we are damned for not doing right" (H 200-01).

"We are not damned for doing wrong; we are damned for not doing right."

As Muirhead sums up Aristotle's teaching on this point:

74:3.15 *Muirhead,* in summing up Aristotle's doctrine, says:

"True courage must be for a noble object.

"True courage must be for a noble object—

Here, as in all excellence, action and object, consequence and motive, are inseparable.

consequence and motive are inseparable.

Unless the action is inspired by a noble motive, and permeated throughout its whole structure by a noble character, it has no claim to the name of courage" (H 206).

Unless the action is inspired by a noble motive and permeated through its whole structure by a noble character, it has no claim to the name of courage."

In Aristotle's words:

In Aristotle's words:

SOURCE

"We acquire the virtues by doing the acts, as is the case with the arts too. We learn an art by doing that which we wish to do when we have learned it; we become builders by building and harpers by playing the harp..." (H 207).

VII: ARISTOTELIAN FRIENDSHIP (Hyde 209)

Friendship he defines as "unanimity on questions of the public advantage and on all that touches life."

This unanimity, however, is very different from agreement in opinion.

It is seeing things from the same point of view;

or, more accurately, it is the appreciation of each other's interests and aims.

The whole tendency of Aristotle thus far has been to develop individuality;

to make each man different from every other man (H 209).

XI: JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS (Adams, in *Living Philosophies* 153)

The study of my own mind and a reasonable study of other peoples' tell me that for every human being there are two laws, two imperatives (leaving out mere desire): the civil law of his social group, tribe, or nation, and the moral law. The first tells him "you must,"

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"We acquire the virtues by doing the acts, as is the case with the arts too. We learn an art by doing that which we wish to do when we have learned it; we become builders by building and harpers by playing the harp."

74:3.16 Friendship Aristotle defines as "unanimity on questions of the public advantage and on all that touches life."

But his concept of unanimity did not mean agreement of opinions.

He only meant the ability to get the same point of view—

clearly to discern and appreciate mutual interests and aims.

He aimed consistently at the development of robust and courageous individuality—

personality in each man which would differ from that of every other man.

4. Duty—Moral Obligation

74:4.1 Save the most mechanistically minded, the majority of thinkers agree that man is an animal plus,[2] plus at least a moral nature;

that he not only recognizes his ethical obligation of a social nature which admonish "You must,"

but that there is an ideal and higher realm of moral obligation which ever presents its demands to conscience as the imperative

and the second "you ought" (A 154).

"You ought."

du´ty ... **Syn.—** ... "The path of *duty* was the way to glory" (*Tennyson*) ... (*Webster's* 802).

74:4.2 The poet *Tennyson* voiced this moral concept when he wrote, "The path of duty was the way to glory."

But always in the consideration of the philosophy of duty as it may help nervous patients in their program of emotional reconstruction and personality unification, the physician must bear in mind the danger of fostering a "perfection complex." Many neurotics are already greatly overburdened with this sense of moral obligation, sometimes extending, as the result of a pathologic conscience, to the borders of moral condemnation and spiritual despair.

74:4.3 But when all is said and done, it appears that a large number of average citizens are motivated by this "sense of duty," to which, of course, there is both a positive and a negative side. It is indeed unfortunate when the motivation of life is largely negativistic, when one's program for living is so hedged about by the negative requirements of taboos and prohibitions. A philosophy of life activated by a sense of moral obligation, to be psychiatrically helpful, must be *dynamically positive.* A personal credo which consists in an accumulation of inhibitions is of little value in psychic training.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
	74:4.4 A sense of moral obligation as a credo for living will ever be impractical and disappointing if it does not include a keen sense of *social obligation.* Without the recognition of social duty, moral duty sometimes leads into mysticism and asceticism.
What is "morality"? ... To-day it is almost as unsettled as ever despite *The New Oxford Dictionary* (A 153).	74:4.5 The term morality has had diverse meanings in various ages, and even at any one time it symbolizes vastly different concepts as it is encountered on divergent levels of civilization.
	Even at any one time and among any homogeneous race, moral concepts present a wide range of dissimilarities as they are entertained by different individuals.
Perhaps our cavemen ancestors discussed the problem as they sat around the fire at night while the sabre-toothed tiger snarled without, a hundred thousand years ago (A 153).	No doubt the exact meaning of this term or of this subtle conviction has been the subject of interested discussion from the earliest times of evolving cave-man civilization.
	No matter what one's views respecting the nature of the moral domain, I think we all agree (that is, those who recognize morality as a reality) that it in a general way distinguishes
For our present purpose I choose to define morality as that portion of human thought and conduct that stems from and is controlled by "I ought"	the domain of "I ought"
as contrasted with either "I want" or "I must."	from the more definitely social sense of obligation which presents itself to conscience as "I must."
I am not here concerned with discovering where this feeling of "ought" came from or with analyzing it philosophically.	Notwithstanding our difficulty in accounting for the origin and explaining the nature of morality,

It has existed in the best specimens of *homo sapiens* for many millennia past, and for the moment I accept it as an original datum (A 153).

Morality is real, account for it as we may or may not (A 154).

most of us are disposed to admit that it is a reality in human experience.

I have no hesitation, you will note, in conceding that it belongs to the emotional rather than the rational portion of man's nature. Man is a creature of impulse, emotion, action rather than reason (A 153).

74:4.6 The emotional urge, the constraint of reason, and even the ethical sense of social obligation are all influential in the motivation of human lives,

but there is present in the experience of the average individual a still stronger urge which, although it so frequently embraces all of these antecedent drives, represents a higher, more noble, and in many cases, an immeasurably more effective, basis for the formulation of a personal credo.

We are now floundering in a morass.

No one will dispute that the moral motivation of civilized peoples is at a comparatively low ebb at the present time.

Considerable numbers of both clergy and scientists are beginning to show signs of panic, while the super-business men vaguely sense that something must be done to make society "safe" (A 161).

In fact, there is considerable uneasiness over this most deplorable situation among both moralists and many scientists;

sooner or later we must face the fact that the moral derelictions and spiritual shortcomings of a race or nation cannot be immediately corrected by the enactment of laws.

Morals are hardly a mass proposition; they are a problem of the individual.

Unfortunately, because of the fact that the moral law by its very nature cannot be enforced by physical or political power (which is precisely why its field is different from that of the civil law), the problem of providing a sanction for it is one of extreme difficulty (A 159).

The morality of a people is not going to be improved by establishing arbitrary moral standards and then seeking their validation by the sanction of civil law.

74:4.7 The individual whose life is morally motivated and whose philosophy of living consists in loyalty to this conviction of moral obligation, may freely make use in his day-by-day experience of many of the essential factors of other schools of philosophy. He may be more or less of a Stoic, something of an Aristotelian, and he is always somewhat Platonic in his feelings. In building a personal credo, though one's philosophy of living may lean strongly toward some one of the great groups we are discussing, it has been my observation that about one-half of my patients are driving through life by means of the dynamics of a composite or mixed type of philosophy, while many individuals progressively build up a credo which is quite exclusively their own.

[See endnote no. 1.]

The philosophy of living, to meet the requirements of duty,

For a few generations ahead, perhaps, the fear of plague or starvation is lifted from us, but we still have need of self-control and self-discipline—the "Golden Mean" of the Greeks, the ethics of Christ, or the doctrine of the Stoics (A 170).

oftentimes embraces the stern self-discipline of the Stoic as well as the noble self-sacrifice of religious devotion.

[JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS is one of the most notable of American historians and social critics. Among his books are The Adams Family, Our Business Civilization and The Founding of New England (*Living Philosophies* 332).]

74:4.8 A well-known social critic and historian,* [*Adams, James Truslow: Living Philosophies, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1923.]

How are we to try to be good—that is, to live a life in which we shall strive for the deepest, the noblest and most enduring satisfactions, and to try to rise to the highest possibilities of our entire nature?

It seems to me the most sensible thing to do is rest heavily for insight and instruction on those great teachers of the past who summed up in their words the wisdom of the race (A 174).

in expressing his personal credo, recently said:

74:4.9 How are we to try to be good—that is, to live a life in which we shall strive for the deepest, the noblest, and most enduring satisfaction, and to try to rise to the highest possibilities of our entire nature?

It seems to me the most sensible thing to do is to rest heavily for insight and instruction on those great teachers of the past who summed up in their words the wisdom of the race.

5. Idealism—Platonism

74:5.1 In a general way, modern idealism is an evolution of Plato's doctrines as modified by later idealistic philosophies, including many sentiments which are largely Christian in origin. Regardless of one's leaning toward some one or more of the generally recognized idealistic schools of thought, the credo of idealism, in the case of a given individual, largely represents that person's loyalty and devotion to his own idealistic concept of the nature, objects, and aims of human life. And the psychiatrist who fails to recognize, and neglects to utilize, this potent influence (especially in the case of younger patients) for personality orientation and psychiatric reconstruction, is guilty of failing to employ one of the mightiest curative agencies at his disposal.

74:5.2 The average neurotic patient is all but indifferent to the metaphysical distinctions and the philosophic differentiations of the various schools of idealism—Platonism, Berkeleian, Hegelian, Cartesian, Lockian, Humean, or Kantian.

74:5.3 I regard the concept of the validity of nonmaterial realities as a highly beneficial influence in the practice of psychiatry. This sort of idealism can be practically utilized in psychotherapy while the many extreme and unscientific tenets of the more mystical and bizarre schools of thought are rejected. Nevertheless, the transcendentalism of Kant will ever be more helpful and inspiring than the skepticism of Hume.

74:5.4 But when all is said and done, it develops that Plato was the real founder of this school of philosophy, and even Christianity eventually came to embody many of the more spiritual concepts of this Greek wise man.

III: THE PLATONIC SUB-ORDINATION OF LOWER TO HIGHER (Hyde 110)

I. THE NATURE OF VIRTUE (Hyde 110)

[contd] EPICUREANISM tells how to gain pleasure; Stoicism tells us how to bear pain.

74:5.5 Epicureanism told how to gain pleasure; Stoicism how to bear pain.

But life is not so simple as these systems assume.

But life is hardly so simple as these philosophies assume.

It is not merely the problem of getting all the pleasure we can; nor of taking pain in such wise that it does not hurt.

Human existence is not merely a question of gaining pleasure and avoiding pain.

It is a question of the worth of the things in which we find our pleasure, and the relative values of the things we suffer for.

Living also presents the problem of evaluating our pleasures and appraising our pains.

Plato squarely attacks that larger problem (H 110).

Plato squarely faces this larger problem.

Virtue, then, is the supreme good, and makes everything that furthers it, whether pleasurable or painful, good.

He affirms that virtue is the supreme good and recognizes that everything which furthers it, whether pleasurable or painful, is good.

Virtue makes everything that hinders it, whether pleasurable or painful, bad (H 111).

Likewise, virtue designates all opposing influences, whether pleasurable or painful, as evil—bad.

II. RIGHTEOUSNESS WRIT LARGE (Hyde 116)

The defect of Plato lies in the eternal arrangements by which he proposed to secure the right relation of parts to the whole.

74:5.6 The weakness of Plato's concept is found in his faulty technic for securing the right relation of parts to the whole.

His measures for securing this subordination were partly material and physical, partly visionary and unnatural,

His plan for subordination of the inferior to the superior was partly material and partly visionary.

He failed sufficiently to take into account

where ours must be natural, social, intellectual, and spiritual.

the social, the intellectual, and the spiritual.

But he did lay down for all time the great principle that

But he did proclaim and emphasize the time-honored truth of the necessity for

the due subordination of the parts to the whole, of the members to the organism, of individuals to the state

the subordination of the parts to the service of the whole, of the members to the organism, of individuals to society,

is the essence of righteousness in a state, and an indispensable condition of political well-being (H 122-23).

as an indispensable condition of personal self-realization and political well-being.

III. THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (Hyde 123)

[contd] Righteousness is a state then consists in each class minding its own business,

74:5.7 Plato conceived that political righteousness consisted in each class's minding its own business,

and performing its specific function for the good of the state as a whole (H 123).

while sincerely functioning for the welfare of the whole.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
There are three grand departments in each man's life: his appetites, his spirit, and his reason (H 123).	He taught that there are three grand divisions of each man's life: his appetites, his spirit, and his reason.
VII. THE INTRINSIC SUPERIORITY OF RIGHTEOUSNESS (Hyde 153)	
The reason why the life of a righteous man is happier than the life of an unrighteous man is that it has "a greater share in pure existence as a more real being" (H 154).	74:5.8 The reason why the life of a righteous man is happier than that of an unrighteous is that it has "a greater share in pure existence as a moral real being."
	He taught that the ideal character results from the domination of intellect over passion and spirit.
Finally Plato sums up the discussion by anticipating the question which Jesus asked four centuries later.	He summed up his philosophy by really anticipating the question which Jesus asked four centuries later:
"How would a man profit if he receive gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? ..." (H 156).	"How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst?"
	Jesus said: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"
VIII. TRUTH AND ERROR IN PLATONISM (Hyde 159)	
[contd] Obviously this Platonic principle is vastly deeper and truer than anything we have had before.	74:5.9 Plato's doctrines transcended every philosophy which preceded him as far as history records.
The personality at which both Stoic and Epicurean aimed was	The personality which both Stoics and Epicureans visualized was
highly abstract,—something to be gained by getting away from the tangle and complexity of life	sought by avoiding the difficult problems of life
rather than by conquering and transforming the conditions of existence into expressions of ourselves (H 159).	rather than by facing, conquering, and transforming them.

Plato comes out in the open field, and squarely gives battle to the hosts of appetite, passion, temptation, and corruption, of which the world outside, and our hearts inside are full.

74:5.10 Plato squarely faces appetite, passion, emotion, and corruption.

In this he is true to the moral experience of the race: and his trumpet-call to the higher departments of our nature to enter the "great combat of righteousness";

He challenges the moral nature of man to enter the "great combat of righteousness."

his demand of instantaneous and absolute surrender which he presents to everything low and sensual within us, are clear, strong notes which it is good for every one of us to hear and heed.

To him as to Carlyle,

To him as to Carlyle:

"Life is not a May-game, but a battle and a march, a warfare with principalities and powers. No idle promenade through fragrant orange-groves and green flowery spaces waited on by the choral muses and the rosy hours; it is a stern pilgrimage through the rough, burning, sandy solitudes, through regions of thick-ribbed ice. He walks among men, loves men with inexpressible soft pity, as they *cannot* love him; but his soul dwells in solitude, in the uttermost parts of creation..." (H 160).

74:5.11 Life is not a May-game, but a battle and a march, a warfare with principalities and powers. No idle promenade through fragrant orange groves and green flowery spaces waited on by the choral muses and the rosy hours; it is a stern pilgrimage through the rough, burning, sandy solitudes, through regions of thick-ribbed ice. He walks among men, loves men with inexpressible soft pity, as they *cannot* love him; but his soul dwells in solitude, in the uttermost parts of creation.

This is a note which appeals forcibly to every noble youth.

74:5.12 Plato's ideals appeal strongly to every noble youth.

It has been struck by the Hebrew Prophets and the Christian Apostles:

This same call to man's moral nature has been sounded by the Hebrew Prophets, by the Christian Apostles

by Savonarola and Fichte, and a host of heroic souls;

and by many another heroic soul;

but by no one more clearly and constrainingly than by Plato (H 161).

but by none of them more effectively and charmingly than Plato.

SOURCE

In Neoplatonism, in the many forms of mysticism, in certain aspects of Christian asceticism, and notably in the numerous phases of what calls itself "New Thought" to-day, what was for the most part latent in Plato, becomes frankly explicit (H 162).

As Carlyle has represented for us the stronger side of Platonism,

his friend Emerson shall serve to illustrate the weakness that lurks half hidden in all this way of thinking.

It is so concealed that we shall hardly detect it unless we are sharply on the watch for this tendency to exalt the Infinite at the expense of the finite;

the Universal at the expense of the particular; God at the expense of our neighbour (H 165).

74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY

"In Neoplatonism, in the many forms of mysticism, in certain aspects of Christian asceticism, and notably in the numerous phases of what calls itself New Thought today, what was for the most part latent in Plato, becomes frankly explicit."

74:5.13 Carlyle portrays the stronger side of Platonism,

while *Emerson* represents much of the weakness which is concealed in this great philosopher's teachings.

In exalting the Infinite at the price of all but ignoring the finite,

in emphasizing the supremacy of Deity while almost wholly neglecting our neighbor,

Plato exhibited the lack of that better-proportioned philosophy of Aristotle and the still later and amazingly well-balanced philosophy of Jesus.

74:5.14 *Leibniz* might by some be classified as an optimist, while others would regard him as something of an idealist.

Leib·nitz´i·an·ism ... The philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, or Leibniz (1646-1716), a rationalistic and pluralistic spiritualism or idealism.

Leibniz's philosophy consists in rationalistic or pluralistic idealism.

His chief doctrines are: (1) The ultimate constituents of all reality are indestructible and unchanging monads, which are spiritual beings or souls.

He teaches that ultimate reality consists in indestructible spiritual being.

They are unextended, but possess resistance or force, from which property all the physical properties of matter are derived.

All physical properties are derived from the force of these souls.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
(2) Monads of different types differ from one another in the degree of clarity with which they are conscious of or reflect the mind of God, and, hence, all reality....	These spirit monads differ in their degree of reflecting reality—the mind of God.
(4) This is the best of all possible worlds (see OPTIMISM) ...	He regards this as the best of all worlds
Apparent evil is not a positive reality but a mere privation, like darkness, which is necessary to the perfection of the whole, as shadows in a picture (*Webster's* 1413).	and teaches that evil is not a reality—merely a privation.
	74:5.15 In general, the philosophic "absolutists" belong to one or another of the idealistic schools;
"A SEARCH FOR SYSTEM," by G. Watts Cunningham (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 1* 248)	
[contd] Born 1881; Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University (C 248).	Professor *Cunningham,* of Cornell University,
In one sense of the word I certainly am an absolutist, and I do not see how any of us (whatever our method) escape from being so. We all seek for that which gives us final satisfaction; that we call the real, and that is what I understand the absolute in principle to be (C 268).	acknowledges such absolutist leanings.
"THE GREAT ART WHICH IS PHILOSOPHY," by Hartley Burr Alexander (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 1* 87)	
[contd] Born 1873; Professor of Philosophy, Scripps College, California (A 87).	Professor *Alexander,* of California,
With this avowal I presume that I should accept the name of idealist, yet I must draw back from assuming it in any but a Platonic sense (A 103).	is something of a Platonic idealist,

"PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY," by A. C. Armstrong (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 1* 113)

[contd] Born 1860; Professor Philosophy in Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut (A 113).

while Professor *Armstrong,* of Wesleyan University,

... Kant's steadfast conviction that faith as well as knowledge is a function of reason, of reason functioning in its practical form; the subordination of desire and feeling in favour of a rational faith—these positions ... prepared the way ... for a progressive development of [Kant's] doctrine's inner meaning. On such foundations it is possible to build more comprehensive and more accurate formulations of the philosophy of values, as these are brought out by the progress of reflective inquiry (A 132-33).

seems to prefer the Kantian trends.

"NATURE AND REASON," by John Elof Boodin (*in Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 1* 135)

[contd] Born in Sweden, 1869; Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles (B 135).

74:5.16 Professor *Boodin,* of the University of California,

My cosmic idealism found expression in *Cosmic Evolution,* 1925 (B 141).

holds a system of belief which he denominates

"cosmic idealism,"

and it is so liberal as to provide for belief in

Spiritual qualities are as real as material qualities, and in human life are more important. By spiritual qualities I mean those which we recognize in our social intercourse, including the intercourse with the divine, wherever it is an experience and not just words (B 160).

spiritual realities.

In the light of his credo

Pragmatism is now dead, and it is not unseemly to speak ill of the dead. No one seems to want to own it now, except writers of French doctor's theses. Schiller is a "humanist" and Dewey a "naturalistic empiricist" (B 140).

he regards Schiller as a humanist and Dewey as a "naturalistic empiricist."

Professor Boodin believes that

Ideals are creative energies in nature (B 160).

"ideals are creative energies in nature,"

and his attitude toward materialism is summed up by his statement that

Matter is essentially a medium of exchange (B 163).

"matter is essentially a medium of exchange."

74:5.17 *Bergson* might be classified among numerous nonmaterialistic groups of philosophers, but he perhaps more nearly belongs among the idealists.

Berg´son·ism ... The philosophy of Henri Bergson (b. 1859), a French philosopher and professor. Bergson conceives the world as a process of creative evolution in which the novelty of successive phenomena rather than the constancy of natural law is the significant fact.

His philosophy maintains that the world is a phenomenon of creative evolution.

Reality is time or duration (*la durée réelle*), which is the same as free motion and is the expression of a vital impetus (*élan vitale*) or creative force....

Reality is time—duration—that free motion which is the expression of vital impetus or creative force.

[A] true apprehension of reality is to be gained, not by the analytic procedures of mathematics and science, but by that intuition which can grasp wholes as such.

Reality is recognized, not by analytical science, but by the intuitional grasp of wholes.

This position is often described as *anti-intellectualism* (*Webster's* 256).

Bergsonianism is generally spoken of as being "anti-intellectual."

6. Realism—Presentationism

74:6.1 As the philosophic school of Stoicism and Epicureanism are contrastive, and as the materialistic and spiritistic philosophies are so completely antithetical, so are the idealistic and realistic schools set the one in array against the other.

"REALISM IN RETROSPECT," by Ralph Barton Perry (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 185)

74:6.2 When idealism ranges from Plato's doctrines down through Hegel, Locke, Hume, and Kant

Idealism seems to me, here again, to reduce itself to the same untenable alternatives solipsism, relativism, absolutism.

to the extreme teachings of the solipsist,

The solipsist says,

whose doctrine claims that

the universe consists solely of the individual and his own experiences, culminating in an egotism which declares

"Only what I approve is good, only what I disapprove is evil" (P 203-04).

"only that which I approve is good,"

it is little wonder that logical thinkers should, from time to time, find themselves engaged in both personal and group protests against these extreme philosophies.

This entire group of philosophers, extending from the times of the Greeks down to the present, embraces half a dozen distinct schools of thought, some veering but little from idealism, teaching that the objective world arises only because of the direct psychic awareness of such a material world. Other realists hold that sense perceptions are real in their own right, and that they exist independently of their recognition by the mind.

[*Note:* See 74:0.32 and 74:0.33, above, for more accurate descriptions of these schools.]

74:6.3 The so-called *critical realists* insist that objects arise through the "selective and critical elaboration of the data of consciousness." There is a school of realism that is closely akin to Kant's philosophy in that it avers that the world of physical phenomena can be directly experienced but always in accordance with Kant's formula; that is, "subject to the a priori conditions of all experience."

[*Note:* See 74:0.34 and 74:0.35, above, for more accurate descriptions of these schools.]

Such, in brief, is the train of argument by which I have justified my own dissent from idealism, and in which for the most part I have been in agreement with those of my American colleagues who in 1910 formulated a "Programme and First Platform," and in 1912 wrote in collaboration the volume entitled *The New Realism* (P 199).

74:6.4 In 1912 a group of American philosophers, members of the American Philosophic Association and mostly professors of philosophy in prominent universities, got together and formulated the basic doctrine of what they were pleased to call the "new realism."

It is not easy concisely to state in just what this new realism consists, but it certainly provides for a much broader philosophy than any of the older realistic credos.

[*Note:* Sadler clearly had not read *The New Realism.* In his essay in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* (p. 145), Wm. Pepperell Montague, one of the contributors to *The New Realism,* describes the project: "Our realism was thus not a philosophy; it was rather a prolegomenon to philosophy and a declaration of independence that would make it possible to investigate the nature of things on their own merits ..."]

[*Note:* In his essay Perry repeatedly rejects idealism in the metaphysical or epistemological sense.]

One can be a new realist while at the same time being very much of an idealist,

moralist,

It is evident, then, that in practical matters I am old-fashioned—that is to say, Christian and democratic in the historic senses of these terms (P 208).

and even an adherent of the Christian religion,

and such a realist is

Born 1876; Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (P 185).

Professor Ralph Barton *Perry,* professor of philosophy at Harvard University.

"EMPIRICAL IDEALISM," by De Witt H. Parker (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 161)

[contd] Born 1885; Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan (P 161).

74:6.5 Professor DeWitt H. *Parker,* professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, styles himself an "empirical idealist,"

"PERSONAL REALISM," by James Bissett Pratt (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 211)

[contd] Born 1875; Professor of Philosophy, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass. (P 211).

while Professor James *Bissett,* of Williams College, calls himself a "personal realist."

[*Note:* Sadler meant James Bissett Pratt, but mentions 'Pratt' below, as if Pratt were a different person.]

"PROBLEMATIC REALISM," by J. Loewenberg (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 53)

[contd] Born 1882; Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, California (L 53).

Professor *Loewenberg,* of the University of California, styles himself a "problematic realist."

Among other American realists of one or another set of beliefs may be mentioned

"BRIEF HISTORY OF MY OPINIONS," by George Santayana (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 237)

Santayana,

The necessity of naturalism as a foundation for all further serious opinions was clear to me from the beginning (S 245).

"NATURE AND MIND," by Charles Augustus Strong (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 311)

Strong,

A philosopher so full of animal faith and so generous in the assumption of reals as I am ... (S 321).

"A TEMPORALISTIC REALISM," by Arthur O. Lovejoy (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 83)

Lovejoy,

[See note on previous pg.]

Pratt,

[See 74:6.7, below.]

Sellars,

[See 74:8.8, below.]

Rogers,

"IN VESTIGIIS VERITATIS," by Walter G. Everett (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I* 253)

and Everett.

I have asked myself whether my early experiences partly predetermined my choice of realism. [Etc.] (E 333)

74:6.6 The *pragmatists* really belong to some division of the philosophic school of realism.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
"A PHILOSOPHIC MIND IN THE MAKING," by Harold Chapman Brown (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I* 167)	
[contd] Born 1879; Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, California (B 167).	Harold Chapman *Brown,* professor of philosophy at Stanford University,
[*Note:* Brown never calls himself a pragmatist, let alone an "evolving" pragmatist. He mentions pragmatism once: "Royce ... sent me out from Harvard well started on the road to pragmatism" (B 175).]	calls himself an "evolving pragmatist,"
"LOGIC AND PRAGMATISM," by Clarence Irving Lewis (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 29)	
[contd] Born 1883; Associate Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (L 29).	Professor *Lewis,* of Harvard University,
What I shall venture to call "conceptual-istic pragmatism" proved to be, for me, the key that opened many doors (L 44).	confesses to being a "conceptualistic pragmatist,"
"FROM ABSOLUTISM TO EXPERIMENTALISM," by John Dewey (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 11)	
[contd] Born 1859; Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York City (D 11).	while the well-known Professor *Dewey,* of Columbia University,
Were it possible for me to be a devotee of any system, I still should believe that there is greater richness and greater variety of insight in Hegel than in any other single systematic philosopher—though when I say this I exclude Plato, who still provides my favourite philosophical reading (D 21).	who has acknowledged to having been much influenced by Plato and Hegel

As far as I can discover, one specifiable philosophic factor which entered into my thinking so as to give it a new direction and quality, is [the influence of William James] (D 23).

and by James's pragmatism,

This belief [in a logic which would override the dualism between science and morals] has had much more to do with the development of what I termed, for lack of a better word, "instrumentalism", than have most of the reasons that have been assigned (D 23).

now maintains an attitude which he designates as "instrumentalism."

74:6.7 Still other realists of the new school have become so broad in their tenets that they require a group of terms to designate their attitudes; such is the predicament of

"REALISM, NATURALISM, AND HUMANISM," by Roy Wood Sellars (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 259)

[contd] Born 1880; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (S 259).

Professor *Sellars,* of the University of Michigan,

who, being unable to subscribe fully even to the new realism, puts himself down as a believer in "realism, naturalism, and humanism."

"PERSONAL REALISM," by James Bissett Pratt (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 211)

[See 74:12.7, below.]

74:6.8 While *James* was the real founder of the American philosophic school of pragmatism, nevertheless,

The philosophical influences I felt at Harvard centred around two foci, the one James's realistic pluralism, the other the idealistic monism of Royce and Palmer (P 214).

he was a teacher of *realistic pluralism* in contrast with the *idealistic monism* of Royce and Palmer.

74:6.9 These different types of realism represent an effort on the part of many thinkers to avoid the dogmatic and extreme teachings of the mechanistic and materialistic schools of thought characterizing the closing years of the nineteenth, and the earlier years of the twentieth, century while at the same time exhibiting a determination to refuse to swing to the opposite and earlier schools of idealistic philosophy. I presume it could be truthfully said that the majority of American philosophers hold opinions which, if they are to be classified, would fall into some one of the many schools of modern realism.

7. **Humanism—Altruism**

74:7.1 The humanistic school of thought, as a philosophy of living, is a modern development.

hu·man·ism ... **3**. A system, mode, or attitude of thought or action centering upon distinctively human interests or ideals, esp. as contrasted with naturalistic or religious interests.

It seeks to contrast its teachings at one and the same time with both naturalism and religion.

[See 74:0.38, above.]

Like the optimist, the humanist believes in the actuality of human progress; in fact, he all but idealizes such a belief, in that he frankly substitutes faith in man for faith in God. This teaching affirms belief in the perfectibility of human nature.

74:7.2 No one can help admiring much of the idealistic humanitarianism and the altruistic unselfishness embodied in the modern humanism movement, and if it aspired to be only a philosophy of social service, we would all subscribe to its tenets.

We only dissent from the humanist when he seeks to supplant all religion by his otherwise laudable doctrines of social service.

74:7.3 Humanism is the glorification of the Golden Rule shorn of all its religious connotations.

To replace the conception of man as the subject of a heavenly king . . . *humanism* takes as its dominant pattern the progress of the individual from helpless infancy to self-governing maturity.
Walter Lippmann (*Webster's* 1212).

Walter Lippman is one of the more recent exponents of this new philosophy which has essayed to become a religion without a God.

IX: IRVING BABBITT (Babbitt, in *Living Philosophies* 121)

[*Note:* Sadler ignores Babbitt's contrast between humanism and Rousseauism "humanitarianism".]

74:7.4 *Rousseau* was probably the real founder of modern humanism as a philosophy of living.

The passage to which I refer is one that occurs in Rousseau's account of the sudden vision that came to him by the roadside on a hot summer day in 1749 in the course of a walk from Paris to Vincennes.

One hot day in the summer of 1749 Rousseau was walking from Paris to Vincennes when he seems to have experienced some sort of trance-like seizure

This vision has an importance for the main modern movement comparable to that of St. Paul's vision on the road to Damascus for the future development of Christianity.

which very much resembled the recital of St. Paul's experience on the road to Damascus.

Among the multitude of "truths" that flashed upon Rousseau in the sort of trance into which he was rapt at this moment, the truth of overshadowing importance was, in his own words,

Among the thoughts flashing through Rousseau's mind during this unique experience was this:

that "man is naturally good and that it is by our institutions alone that men become wicked" (B 123).

that "man is naturally good, and that it is by our institutions that men become wicked."

The new dualism which Rousseau sets up—that between man naturally good and his institutions—has tended not only to substitute sociology for theology, but to discredit the older dualism in any form whatsoever (B 123-24).

74:7.5 Rousseau initiated a doctrine which has ever since fostered a progressive movement away from theology and toward sociology—

the humanitarian concept of life.

I have said that there has been in connection with this Rousseauistic influence a steady yielding of the theological to the sociological or, as it may also be termed, the humanitarian view of life. One should note that there enters into the total philosophy of humanitarianism an ingredient that antedates Rousseau and that may be defined as utilitarian. Utilitarianism already had its prophet in Francis Bacon.

But there enter into humanism many features of Baconian utilitarian philosophy which antedate Rousseau.

Whatever the differences between the philosophies of *Bacon* and Rousseau,

they have a central drive: they always have encouraged and, one may safely say, always will encourage the substitution of the kingdom of man for the traditional Kingdom of God—

they agree in that each endeavors to substitute a kingdom of man for the Kingdom of God;

the exaltation of material over spiritual "comfort,"

they both strive to exalt material over spiritual "comfort."

the glorification of man's increasing control over the forces of nature under the name of progress (B 124-25).

They glorify man's progressive control of natural forces,

[contd] Rousseauist and Baconian, though often superficially at odds with one another, have coöperated in undermining, not merely religious tradition,

and they have contributed much to undermining both the religious

but another tradition which in the Occident goes back finally, not to Judæa, but to ancient Greece. This older tradition may be defined as humanistic. The goal of the humanist is poised and proportionate living. This he hopes to accomplish by observing the law of measure (B 125).

and the Aristotelian concepts of ideal human living.

Decorum is supreme for the humanist even as humility takes precedence over all other virtues in the eyes of the Christian (B 125).

74:7.6 Decorum is the supreme goal of humanism, even as humility transcends most virtues in the Christian religion.

Says one writer:

The humanist exercises the will to refrain, but the end that he has in view is not the renunciation of the expansive desires but the subduing of them to the law of measure.

74:7.7 The humanist exercises the will to refrain, but the end that he has in view is not the renunciation of the expansive desires but the subduing of them to the law of measure.

The humanistic virtues—moderation, common sense, and common decency—though much more accessible than those of the saint, still go against the grain of the natural man—terribly against the grain, one is forced to conclude from a cool survey of the facts of history (B 132).

The humanistic virtues—moderation, common sense, and common decency—though much more accessible than those of the saint, still go against the grain of the natural man—terribly against the grain, one is forced to conclude from a cool survey of the facts of history.

That Rousseau is at the headwaters of an anti-intellectualist trend extending down to James and Bergson and beyond is generally recognized.

74:7.8 Rousseau initiated an anti-intellectualist trend which extended on down to James and Bergson.

This trend is prefigured in his saying that "the man who thinks is a depraved animal."

This doctrine avers that "the man who thinks is a depraved animal."

At bottom the protest of this type of anti-intellectualist is against the mechanizing of the world by a scientific or pseudo-scientific rationalism (B 134).

In reality, this school of thought is in protest to the intellectualist mechanizing of the universe by pseudoscientific rationalism.

SOURCE

Though the utilitarian-sentimental movement may have triumphed more completely in America than elsewhere,

it has been extending its conquests over the whole of the Occident and is now invading the Orient (B 138).

That the peripheral merits of this movement are almost innumerable I should be the first to admit: indeed, almost everything in it seems plausible

until one penetrates to its very center, and then one discoversan omission that unless corrected vitiates all the rest—

the omission, namely, as I have been trying to show, of any reference to a higher will or power of control (B 138).

[IRVING BABBITT, Professor of French Literature at Harvard University, is America's chief exponent of the Humanist doctrine. His best known book is *Rousseau and Romanticism* (*Living Philosophies* 332).]

Without making any pretense to a prophetic rôle for which I am not qualified,

I am yet willing to express the conviction that unless there is a recovery of the true dualism or, what amounts to the same thing, a reaffirmation of the truths of the inner life in some form—traditional or critical, religious or humanistic—

civilization in any sense that has been attached to that term hitherto is threatened at its base.

74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY

74:7.9 Though this utilitarian, sentimental humanistic movement has spread more in America than elsewhere,

it has also made progress throughout Europe and has even invaded the Orient.

On the surface, humanism presents many attractive qualities,

and it is only when we penetrate to its very core that we really discover the great error of its conception and construction;

viz., the utter absence of all recognition of spiritual reality and of the existence of the higher powers of human will and supreme overcontrol.

74:7.10 In the discussion of humanism in general and Rousseauism in particular,

Professor *Babbitt,* of Harvard University,

well says:

74:7.11 Without making any pretense to a prophetic rôle for which I am not qualified,

I am yet willing to express the conviction that unless there is a recovery of the true dualism or, what amounts to the same thing, a reaffirmation of the truths of the inner life in some form—traditional or critical, religious or humanistic—

civilization in any sense that has been attached to that term hitherto is threatened at its base.

SOURCE

I speak in the interests of civilization, though my own prime objection to Rousseauism is that it is found finally not to make for the happiness of the individual (B 138).

Nie′tzsche· ism ...The philosophical doctrines of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (German philosopher, 1844-1900) and his followers, esp. that of the perfectability of man through forcible self-assertion,

leading to criticism of Christian ethics as servile and to glorification of the overman. 1651

[See 74:0.41, above.]

I speak in the interest of civilization, though my own prime objection to Rousseauism is that it is found finally not to make for the happiness of the individual.

74:7.12 *Nietzsche* propounded a philosophy too peculiarly brutal to be called humanism, and no doubt most present-day humanists would disown him, would hardly want to admit him to warm-hearted fellowship. Nevertheless, technically, Nietzsche is a humanist.

He professed unquestioned belief in the perfectibility of man through forcible self-assertion.

His entire doctrine consists in

a glorification of the "overman."

8. Optimism—Cosmic Adjustment

74:8.1 I believe an optimistic philosophy to be of great value in the practice of psychiatry. The optimist is not blind to the defects of humanity, nor does he fail to recognize the incompleteness of organic evolution, but he does believe in an intelligent "first cause," a beneficent universe ruler of some type, and he thinks that somehow, sooner or later, all things may possibly work together for good.

74:8.2 The optimist firmly believes that, when it comes to the trial balance on the ledger of the Almighty, the good of mortal existence after all overbalances the evil.

[See 74:0.41, above.]

He insists on maintaining an attitude toward human life that emphasizes the good, and he is definitely hopeful of the ultimate outcome of human evolution.

74:8.3 Of course there are all kinds and sorts of optimists, from those foolish addle-brained individuals who pray for rain down to those sane and sensible thinkers like

Leibnitzianism. ... (3) ... What goes on in each mind accords with reality beyond it because of the harmony, pre-established by God, amongst all monads (*Webster's* 1413).

Leibniz, who believed in a systematic sort of divine pre-establishment.

I think humor is one of the most important factors in optimism. The practice of humor prevents one's taking oneself too seriously.[3]

Humor is an insurance policy against becoming overmuch preoccupied with one's philosophy or even one's religion, but the importance of this light-heartedness and cheerfulness has been sufficiently emphasized in another chapter.

[See Chap. 68: "Rest and Relaxation."]

74:8.4 In the twentieth century we are observing the birth of a new kind of scientific optimism or, rather, a restrained and controlled optimistic attitude on the part of certain nonmechanistic scientists. Many astronomers, physicists, and biologists, while imbued with the sense of the magnitude and orderliness of the universe, are possessed of a sort of *cosmic insight* which leads them to believe that the universe is dominated by mind, and that it is not a blind and senseless mechanism running wild or engaged in an uncontrolled outward flight as the result of an explosion and the universe center in the well-nigh eternal past.[4]

[*Note:* Sadler was probably referring to: "If the idealist is justified in saying with Margaret Fuller, 'I accept the universe,' the realist is equally justified in remarking with Carlyle, 'By gad, she'd better'" (Ralph Barton Perry, in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II*, p. 192.]

74:8.5 Cosmic citizens[5] not only "accept the universe,"

but they believe that the universe is friendly, not only to the human species, but, in a certain and ultimate sense, even to the individual.

VIII: SIR JAMES JEANS (Jeans, in *Living Philosophies* 107)

Fifty years ago,

74:8.6 For a season following the dawn of the scientific age—the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—

with the passing of so much that was superstition in science, philosophy, and religion,

the universe was generally looked on as a machine: it was said that the final aim of science was to explain all the objects in the world, including living bodies, as machines ...

a wave of materialism swept over the scientific world,

Modern science gives but little support to such materialistic views (J 117).

but in recent times this mechanistic wave has begun to recede.

Many a scientist of national and even international standing today will agree with

[SIR JAMES JEANS is the Astronomer Royal and the author of many widely known books including *The Universe Around Us, Astronomy and Cosmology, The Mysterious Universe,* and *The Stars in Their Courses* (*Living Philosophies* 332).]

a great astronomer

who, in discussing these matters, said:

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
The scientific age has dawned, and we recognise that man himself is the master of his fate, the captain of his soul.	"We recognize that man himself is the master of his fate, the captain of his soul.
He controls the course of his ship and so, of course, is free to navigate it into fair waters or foul, or even to run it on the rocks (J 109).	He controls the course of his ship, and, of course, is free to navigate it into fair water or foul or even to run it on the rocks."
	Many of our scientific friends who are more or less skeptical of the possibility of survival after death seem to experience considerable satisfaction as they
Whatever our views on a future life in another world, we recapture the old Jewish concept of an immortality in this world—or something which is effectively as good as immortality—	revive the old Jewish concept of racial immortality—
enjoyed not *by* us but *through* us, by our posterity (J 109-10).	survival not by the individual but through him.
We see ourselves as the architects of a tremendous future, with science giving us the power to build for good or evil, to make or to mar (J 110).	The optimistic scientist, to say the least, envisages an intriguing and tremendous future,
	and he is inclined to agree with a renowned colleague who, in speaking of universal phenomena, said:
We come to entities and phenomena which are in no sense mechanical. To me they seem less suggestive of mechanical than of mental processes: the universe seems to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine.	"To me they seem less suggestive of mechanical than of mental processes: the universe seems to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine.
Such, at least, is the view I feel inclined to take at present, while fully conscious that at any time the pendulum may swing back again as our scientific knowledge increases (J 117).	Such, at least, is the view I feel inclined to take at present."

74:8.7 It is a great gain for the neurotic individual to abandon his feeling of being a cosmic orphan, as it were, lost in the turmoil and magnitude of a great and ruthless universe, and to progress to that level of self-realization and universe insight where he espouses, and rejoices in the satisfaction of, cosmic citizenship. While it is true that many cosmic optimists are more or less spiritual in their outlook and even religious in feeling, nevertheless, large numbers of other persons who pursue such a philosophy of living belong more definitely to that group of cosmic philosophers who, while failing to quite grasp the idea of a personal and beneficent Supreme Being, like Jeans and Eddington, do very definitely sufficiently comprehend universe meanings to feel quite at home on this terrestrial sphere

[The earth performs its yearly journey round the sun at the speed of about 18 ½ miles a second ... (Sir James Jeans, *The Universe Around Us* [1929], p. 34).]

as it plunges on through space at sixteen miles or more a second.

"EMPIRICISM," by Arthur Kenyon Rogers (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. II* 221)

74:8.8 Many of the philosophic *empiricists,*

[contd] Born 1868; late Professor of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (R 221).

like Professor *Rogers,* of Yale,

while they perhaps would hardly wish to be classified as "optimists,"

My conviction still persists that any whole-hearted exercise of the practical intelligence in terms of an ideal must needs be backed for most men by a belief, or at least a hope, that the universe is friendly to man and ready to meet him half-way (R 233).

nevertheless do believe in a "friendly universe,"

[!]

and many of them make a place in their philosophic systems for a "future life."

A genuinely empirical view will get its data from the things that come home to us in first-hand experience,

These empiricists believe in the reality of those things which come home to one's consciousness as the result of "first-handed experience"

and any metaphysics which results in disrupting these and leaving them without final significance, whatever its claim as metaphysics, at any rate is not empiricism (R 227).

in contrast with the *rationalistic* philosophers who tend to believe more in the Hegelian type of logic.

9. Self-Realization—Goal Pursuit

74:9.1 The lures of living can be formulated into a bona fide philosophy of life. Our nervous patients can be inveigled into developing real life interests and then in elevating such interests to the position of a true life purpose, a real philosophy of living.

74:9.2 A psychiatrist knows how certain types of intellectually lazy and socially squeamish individuals will adopt technics of neuroticism as a surreptitious method of avoiding honest and fearless competition. Neuroticism is often a species of goal striving—a dishonest method of avoiding fair competition with one's fellows by honestly facing the reality of life situations.

74:9.3 There is a certain incentive for action and a definite satisfaction of living in the fact of the consciousness of self-realization.

XIII: JULIA PETERKIN (Peterkin, in *Living Philosophies* 195)

A well-known novelist, in narrating her personal credo, said:* [*Peterkin, Julia: Living Philosophies, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1933.]

I do feel a certain dignity in the fact that I am alive, while myriads of forms, less able to meet and adapt themselves to circumstances than my ancestors and I have been, have perished from the earth;

74:9.4 I do feel a certain dignity in the fact that I am alive, while myriads of forms, less able to meet and adapt themselves to circumstances than my ancestors and I have been, have perished from the earth;

for my being alive proves that I came from stock with a strong will to live and the hardiness to persist in living and in reproducing its kind (P 202).

for my being alive proves that I came from stock with a strong will to live and the hardiness to persist in living and in reproducing its kind.

74:9.5 There are many phases of possible self-realization which can be fabricated into a philosophy of living. Let us call attention to just a few:

74:9.6 1. **Skill.**—Those individuals who have special abilities, particularly artistic talents, such as music, painting, writing, are able to pursue such technics of self-realization as a real goal of living. They can build the unfolding of such abilities into a genuine philosophy of life.

74:9.7 2. **Discovery.**—Other types of human beings pursue scientific research with an avidity which betokens that they have exalted such activities into a real and enjoyable philosophy of living.

74:9.8 3. **Adventure.**—The thrill of doing new things and attempting the unique is a lure which some people are able to follow as a philosophy of life, and they do so quite separate and apart from their hedonistic fellows who are out merely to enjoy the sensuous pleasures of living. Adventure can really become a plan of life, and these adventurers, although they sometimes wander into unprofitable paths, nevertheless greatly enjoy their irregular and exciting technics of living.

74:9.9 4. **Invention.**—The development or perfection of an invention is a life program with many an odd genius. True, inventors are activated by a queer assortment of mixed motives. Nevertheless, many a personality has been well integrated about the pursuit of some invention and has been fairly well unified as the result of the concentrated efforts put forth to bring some such brain child to practical fruition.

74:9.10 5. **Ambition.**—Many human beings are so definitely and positively ambitious, so determined to reach some intellectual, social, or economic level, that they convert such ambition into a goal, or life pursuit. In other cases it is the ambition to secure and to be able effectively to wield power, that serves as a nucleus of realization around which the personality is increasingly unified with the passing of time.

74:9.11 6. **Glory.**—The goal of living for some vainglorious individuals is nothing more nor less than the satisfaction derived from adulation. They are interested in neither riches, power, nor a noble character unless these can be made to contribute directly to the augmentation of honor and glory.

74:9.12 7. **Security.**—The urge to make oneself economically secure, the ambition to enjoy leisure, these are built into a philosophy of life by many prudent and far-seeing individuals. The hope to enjoy an old age free from want or the craving of security and leisure for one's family, likewise becomes the dominating motive for living in the experience of many thrifty persons.

[*Compare:* The scientists further tell us that a lot of people take up reforms in order to escape temptation. They feel they are weak, and they espouse a good cause in an effort to extricate themselves from danger (William S. Sadler, M.D., *The Truth About Spiritualism* [1923], 1:6.7).]

74:9.13 8. **Reform.**—The desire to make the world better, or at least different, is not always a defense reaction functioning as a smoke screen to cover up one's similar weaknesses of character.

There is a certain type of human being who idealizes self-sacrifice and glorifies the devotion to some reformatory pursuit. The desire to be a foreign missionary is not always and wholly a defense reaction practiced for the purpose of masking some character weakness or moral deformity. Impulses actuate human beings that are akin to the maternal instinct, and they lead their devotees into these channels of self-sacrifice which, as time passes, gradually become the dominating motive of life.

74:9.14 9. **Scholarship.**—Scholarly attainment, the desire for knowledge, is the center around which many ambitious intellectuals motivate their lives. The piling of one college degree upon another satisfies the life urge; and such piling of one college degree upon another satisfies the life urge; and such pedantic scholastics create, out of the hunger and thirst for knowledge and its scholarly distinction, a real credo of life, a genuine philosophy for living.

74:9.15 10. **Nobility.**—There is no question that a profound and idealistic self-regard can be turned into an effective philosophy for living. Nobility of character is the personal credo of many natural-born idealists.

74:9.16 11. **Pursuit of Philosophy.**—Every now and then we meet with splendid souls to whom the pursuit of philosophy has become the chief purpose of life. Such individuals can truly be said to have made a philosophy of living out of the continuous study and ardent pursuit of truth. Their credo has thus come to be to live only the more and the better, to understand the philosophy of the realities of the universe.

10. Supreme Authority—Loyalty

74:10.1 The majority of human beings have a great capacity for loyalty to something—some ideal, cause, or institution. The trend of such loyalties is often indicated by our hero-worship; the type of hero which an individual adopts signifies to a certain extent such a person's concept of an ideal human being.

["Almost half the girls studied make selections from the opposite sex, whereas boys seldom put women on their hero lists" (William S. Sadler, M.D., F.A.C.S, *Piloting Modern Youth* [1931], p. 119.]

This is true notwithstanding the sex and other factors which may possibly enter into the almost universal practice, among youths, of the early selection of a hero.

74:10.2 The average person seems to derive a certain amount of satisfaction out of being loyal to something. There is a type of intellectual lassitude which characterizes many persons, and this dislike of hard mental effort is evidenced by the readiness with which these people surrender their independence of thought to some supposedly *supreme authority.*

There are two different brands of loyalty which serve as life motivations: Self-realization can be attempted, and personality unification can be secured, by single-hearted devotion to a cause; and the same results can be obtained on another and somewhat lower level by the surrender of all integrity of individual opinion to implicit reverence for, and obedience to, some established authority. These supreme loyalties may be discussed under the following heads, though, of course, there are many others:

74:10.3 1. **Home—Parental Devotion.**—The personal credo of many fathers and mothers does not extend beyond their ambitions to make a success of their families, to rear and educate their children. The home institution is the focal point of all their loyalties, and the upbuilding and maintenance of the home becomes the master motive for living. It is their philosophy of life. Such a credo is built up out of a glorified parental instinct, home comfort and security, and an idealized sex propensity, but it is certainly very effective in unifying the personalities of many of the superior pagans among modern civilized peoples.

74:10.3 2. **The State—Patriotism.**—In the past, as well as in modern times, loyalty to one's nation has served as the hub around which personality has been unified, and this patriotism has subsequently become a philosophy of life. Individuals so motivated subordinate all personal incentive and ambition to loyalty to their nation. They are activated by but a single sentiment! "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she be always in the right; but our country, right or wrong."

74:10.3 3. **Race—Biologic Integrity.**— There is a compelling power in race association. There is some sort of biologic, as well as social and cultural, solidarity among fairly homogeneous peoples. No matter what some psychologists may teach, the herd instinct is bona fide, and gregariousness is not merely a social propensity. It is also, to a certain extent, racial. While religious influences and cultural drawing powers have helped to hold the Jewish race together even though deprived of a country, race, also, is a part of this picture. Those same attributes of human nature which foster patriotism, in a still larger sense sometimes operate to convert race loyalty into a philosophy of living. Many present-day Zionists live for no other purpose than to satisfy their loyalties to the Zionist movement. There is great philosophic, as well as sociologic and biologic, truth in the old saying that "blood is thicker than water."

74:10.3 4. **Occupation—Professional Honor.**—Many individuals go through life with occupational loyalty—professional honor—as their master motive. Trade unionism is a philosophy of life to certain labor leaders. Many physicians and other professional workers live but to glorify their professions, this devotion to professional loyalty transcending even their own desire to honor and recognition as individual members of their professions.

True, in all these categories of loyalty to some supreme authority there may be interwoven fragments of one or more of the more generally accepted philosophies of living, but the hub of such motivations is devotion to some group authority, to some recognized source of those mandates of living which such individuals acknowledge to be of paramount, if not supreme, importance.

74:10.4 5. **A Church—Unquestioning Faith.**—Many devout souls create a philosophy of living out of their loyalty to authoritarian religion. While such persons may be found in all churches and among the followers of all religions, perhaps the most typical illustrations of this type of life philosophy are to be found among the adherents of Catholicism. I find that many of my Catholic patients hold as their chief loyalty, in fact as their philosophy of life, unquestioning faith in the supreme authority of the head of their church.

XIX: HILAIRE BELLOC (Belloc, in *Living Philosophies* 287)

They do not believe that

Catholicism is not one opinion amongst many,

the tenets of Catholicism represent just one religion among many

nor one set of doctrines and customs amongst many others.

or one set of religious doctrines as contrasted with others.

To them the teachings of the church are supreme; the ideal Catholic is whole-hearted in his loyalty to such teachings.

It is of an essence different from all else.

The Catholic church is unique in that

It is the only institution on earth which ever has, and still does, proclaim itself infallible and absolutely authoritative.

it is the only institution on earth which always has, and now does, proclaim its infallible and absolute authority.

Devout Catholics recognize this,

No one of those other institutions which seem to be of its own kind and nature (because they make many statements in common with Catholic statements or because they have a traditional body or doctrine largely in common with Catholicism—for instance, the Eastern Church) is really of the same stuff at all (B 289).

and they disallow all analogous claims or every other religious authority.

74:10.5 The modern idea of unfettered personal liberty is undoubtedly a superb ideal for human society, but such a concept implies the responsibility of individual choosing, and that is too great an effort for the majority of mortals. Many types of men and women shrink from such exertion, preferring to merge their individualities with some authority-revering group of social or religious conformists. Thus they avoid the necessity of constantly choosing between the good and the evil—the right and the wrong. Instead of formulating a personal philosophy of life, they adopt as their credo unquestioning loyalty to this accepted authority. Such responsibility-dodgers refuse to face their higher cosmic obligations and drift nonchalantly through life, trusting vaguely to conventional social currents or established religion to carry them safely into some destiny of bliss and security.

[Compare 155:5.8-11 of the UB.]

[Other religions] admit no living and teaching authority among men to be continuously infallible and active to-day and for the future (B 289).

74:10.6 Since no other religion claims to present a living and functioning teaching authority which is continuously infallible,

the Catholic church becomes the ideal religious discipline to attract and hold the absolute loyalty of this type of individual, of whom there are many in the world. Perhaps no more outstanding example of such loyalty and devotion to religious authoritarianism can be pointed out than the present-day novelist and historian, *Hilaire Belloc.*

[HILAIRE BELLOC is internationally known a poet, historian, essayist, novelist and Catholic apologist (*Living Philosophies* 333).]

11. Divine Sonship—God-Consciousness

74:11.1 Occidental civilization very generally recognizes Jesus of Nazareth as the world's greatest religionist, and I am inclined to believe that He gave the world its most effective and transcendental philosophy of life. Jesus propounded a credo based on *supreme love* and *unselfish service.* In modern terms of thought, Jesus' teachings might be summed up in the doctrines of the "Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man."

74:11.2 The loyalties and disciplines, the devotion and service, embraced in Jesus' *philosophy of life* He frequently summed up in a single phrase—"Doing the Will of the Father in Heaven." This philosophy of living which Jesus taught and so magnificently exemplified in His personal life on earth, as distinguished from all others, might be denominated a "philosophy of love"; and this philosophy, for purposes of theoretical consideration, may be quite divorced from His gospel of salvation and His doctrine of the survival of an immortal soul.

In Jesus' personal experience, His philosophy of life and His religious living were magnificently integrated into what I conceive to be

[*Compare:* Jesus was the perfectly unified human personality (100:7.18).]

one of the most marvelously unified personalities that has ever lived on earth.

[*Compare:* Jesus loved men so much because he placed such a high value upon them (100:4.4).]

74:11.3 Jesus placed a high value upon men; He called them *sons of God.*

While He seemed to teach humility and advocate a certain sort of self-abasement,

[*Compare:* Man may be a worm of the dust by nature and origin, but when he becomes indwelt by my Father's spirit, that man becomes divine in his destiny (149:6.9).]

nevertheless, He elevated the individual from the concept of a worm of the dust, a lost soul, and a universe orphan to the level of the divine dignity of sonship with God.

"INTRODUCTION," by Professor George Herbert Palmer (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I* 15)

74:11.4 Of all the well-known modern philosophers whose beliefs might very definitely be included in this category of the Divine Sonship, the most outstanding is Professor George Herbert *Palmer,*

[contd] Born Boston, Mass., 1842; Emeritus Professor Philosophy, Harvard University (P 15).

long professor of philosophy at Harvard University.

Professor Palmer very definitely emphasizes the consciousness of Divine Sonship as a central concept in his personal credo.

[A] person is an individual being plus his relations, and these relations are what constitute him to be what he is....

Such relations are not external, like those of space and time. They are constitutive. Therefore, when I call morality the fullness of self-realization, the complex character of the self must be borne in mind (P 35).

He believes that morality consists in "the fullness of self-realization."

The Good News of the Fatherhood of God I accept and find in it daily strength.... Before Jesus revealed the strength available through the Fatherhood God, these palliatives [Stoicism and optimism] had value. But they are superficial and do not touch the sources of inner peace as do the words of Jesus (P 49).

74:11.5 After discarding Stoicism and optimism,

Palmer was led to adopt as the theme song of his personal philosophy "the idea of the fatherhood of God,"

That God was his Father was then the central teaching of Jesus.... I want to summarize briefly some of the varieties of power that came to him through this understanding (P 50).

and he elaborated this concept until it came in his system of belief, to embrace the following seven features.

Chief among them is companionship (P 50).

74:11.6 1. Companionship—

conscious membership in the universe family.

Fears cease.... [F]ear assumes that our Father has evil in store for us. But anyone who has tried will find that his constant care can be trusted (P 50).

74:11.7 2. Cure of fear—

the cessation of mortal dread.

Regret, fear of our erroneous past is banished too (P 50).

74:11.8 3. The banishment of regret.

Faith in fatherhood removes harshness from duty.

74:11.9 4. The removal of harshness and the feelings of slavery from the sense of duty.

Love transforms it. It becomes a kind indication of what had better be done to secure the largest ultimate freedom. Or if I fail at once to feel that kindness, I at least know the blessings I have been receiving from my Father ... (P 50).

[*Note:* Palmer didn't state or suggest this.]

74:11.10 5. The augmentation of the feeling of security.

What takes long in the training of a child, and what our Heavenly Father is especially careful to train us in, is the overcoming of time. Very gradually we acquire patience and learn to prefer a future good to an immediate (P 51).

74:11.11 6. The development of patience—deliverance from the tension of time.

Such acceptance of the guidance of a Heavenly Father is neither Fatalism nor Pessimism. Fatalism lives in a locked-up world where personality has no place. Everything happens because of a central unintentional "it." Jesus and his followers changed "it" to "he" and so made room for selective action on the part of God and ourselves (P 51).

74:11.12 7. Salvation from fatalism.

74:11.13 Palmer's philosophy in its essence is summed up in his conclusion that

In religion I face my father; in morals, my fellow-man, and each is supplemental to the other (P 53).

in religion man faces God, while in morals he faces his fellows.

74:11.14 The goal of this Divine Sonship, in far-distant destiny of God-consciousness which constitutes the core of Jesus' philosophy of living, seems to be summed up in His oft-reiterated statement,

"Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Certainly no philosophy theretofore had ever dared to hold up before evolutionary mankind any such transcendent goal of destiny! This philosophy, then, which Jesus proclaimed was not only a doctrine of living, but it was a search for supreme, even infinite, values.

V: THE CHRISTIAN SPIRIT OF LOVE (Hyde 215)

IV. THE WHOLE-HEARTEDNESS OF LOVE (Hyde 247)

[contd] Love asks for the whole heart or nothing; and all the heart has, be it little or much, must go with it (H 247).

74:11.15 Love demands the whole heart or nothing; and all that the individual has and is, much or little, must go with it.

The idea of a human life dominated by love is incompatible with selfish ease-seeking and self-centered neuroticism.

Said Jesus:

"Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth, where moth and rust consume, and where thieves break through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth consume, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: for where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also (H 249).

74:11.16 Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth, where moth and rust consume, and where thieves break through and steal: but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth consume, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: for where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also.

"Therefore I say unto you, Be not anxious for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than the food, and the body than the raiment? Behold the birds of the heaven, that they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them.

74:11.17 Therefore I say unto you, Be not anxious for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than the food, and the body than the raiment? Behold the birds of the heaven, that they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them.

Are not ye of much more value than they? And which of you by being anxious can add one cubit unto the measure of his life? And why are ye anxious concerning raiment?

Are not ye of much more value than they? And which of you by being anxious can add one cubit unto the measure of his life? And why are ye anxious concerning raiment?

Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin; yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. But if God doth so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?

Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. But if God doth so clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?

Be not therefore anxious, saying, What shall we eat? or What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? For after all these things do the Gentiles seek; for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things (H 252-53).

Be not therefore anxious, saying, What shall we eat? or What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? For after all these things do the Gentiles seek; for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things.

VII. THE SUPREMACY OF LOVE (Hyde 277)

Jesus' Spirit of Love

74:11.18 This concept of supreme love for God and love for one's fellows equal to regard for one's self,

is capable of absorbing into itself whatever we have found valuable in the four previous systems (H 277).

is capable of embracing all the good and positive factors of all other philosophic systems and religious disciplines.

II. THE FULFILMENT OF LOVE THROUGH LAW (Hyde 219)

Jesus' principle of Love, though for clearness and incisiveness often stated in terms of mere altruism, or regard for others, yet taken in its total context, in the light of His never absent reference to the Father's will and the Kingdom of Heaven, is much deeper and broader than that.

74:11.19 Jesus' doctrine of the supremacy of love was more than altruism and humanitarianism.

He so frequently associated His teaching about love with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Heaven—"doing the Father's will."

It gives each man his place and function in the total beneficent system which is the coming Kingdom of God, and then treats him not merely as he may wish to be treated, or we may wish to treat him, but as his place and function in that system require (H 222).

Jesus' philosophy of life provides each individual with a place in Universe economy.

[See Matt. 22:34-40, Mk 12:28-31, and 174:4.2.]

His doctrine of love He summed up as two supreme commandments: First, to love God supremely; second, to love your neighbor as yourself.

[See Jn 13:34 and 180:1.1.]

This latter injunction He subsequently expanded into the command to "love your neighbor as I have loved you."

Again, He declared:

"Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you; that ye may be sons of your Father who is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust.

74:11.20 Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you; that ye may be sons of your Father who is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust.

For if ye love them that love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the Gentiles the same? Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (H 238).

For if ye love them that love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the Gentiles the same? Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

III. THE COUNTERFEITS OF LOVE (Hyde 239)

[contd] Just because Love is so costly, it has a host of counterfeits.

74:11.21 Just because love is so transcendent and so uncommon, it has many counterfeits

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
These counterfeits are chiefly devices for gaining the rewards and honours of Love, without the effort and sacrifice of loving.	which are designed for gaining the rewards of love without paying the price of loving self-sacrifice.
One of the most obvious rewards of Love is being thought kind, generous, good. But this can be secured, apparently, by professing religion, joining the church, repeating the creed, giving money to the poor, subscribing large sums to good causes,—all of which are much cheaper and easier than being kind, and true, and faithful, and considerate in the home, on the farm, in the factory, in the store (H 239).	Prominent among such counterfeits are generosity, kindness, altruistic benefactions, and so-called charitable ministrations.
VII. THE SUPREMACY OF LOVE (Hyde 277)	
To be sure, Mill, Spencer, and others have endeavoured to graft the altruistic fruits of Christianity on to the old Epicurean stock.	74:11.22 Mill, Spencer, and others have labored to engraft the altruistic teachings of Christianity onto the older Epicurean and Greek philosophies,
There is this great difference, however, between such Christianised Epicureanism as that of Mill and Spencer, and Christianity itself.	but there is a wide gulf between the Christianized Epicureanism of Mill and Spencer and the teachings of Jesus.
	True, Jesus did say that He came "That we might have joy, and that our joy might be full," but there is little in common between this transcendent concept of spiritual joy and the selfish pleasures of the older systems of philosophy.
These systems ... can and do point out the incompleteness of merely egoistic Epicureanism; they exhort us to care for the pleasures of others as we do for our own (H 277-78).	Jesus admonishes us to take the same interest in the pleasures of others that we do in our own.
In like manner Christianity takes up all that is true in the Stoic teaching, without falling into its hardness and narrowness (H 279).	The moral heroism of the Stoic, and more, is embraced in Christian loyalties.

The man who has this love of Christ in his heart, and who is devoted to the doing of the Father's loving will, can exclaim in every untoward circumstance,

Listen to the Apostle *Paul* as he cries:

"I can do all things in Him that strenghteneth me."

"I can do all things through Him that strengtheneth me."

He can shout with more than Stoic defiance: " O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?"

He can shout with more than Stoic defiance, "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?"

In all the literature of Stoic exultation in the face of frowning danger and impending doom, there is nothing that can match the splendid outburst of the great Apostle:

In all the literature of Stoic exultation in the face of frowning danger and impending doom, there is nothing that can match the splendid outburst of the great Apostle:

"Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword ? Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us.

74:11.23 Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness or peril, or sword ? Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us.

For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord" (H 280-81).

For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

Christianity is as lofty as Platonism; but it gets its elevation by a different process.

74:11.24 Christianity is as idealistic as Platonism, but it attains such heights by a new technic.

Instead of rising above drudgery and details,

Instead of rising above drudgery by sheer force of discipline,

it lifts them up into a clearer atmosphere,

it elevates all living up to that level

where nothing is servile or menial which can glorify God or serve a fellow-man (H 282).

where nothing is servile or menial which can be performed for the glory of God or the service of mankind.

SOURCE

[contd] The great truth which Plato taught was the subordination of the lower elements in human nature to the higher.

In the application of this truth, as we say, Plato went far astray.

His highest was not attainable by every man;

and he proposed to enforce the dictates of reason by fraud and intimidation on those incapable of comprehending their reasonableness.

Thus he was led into that fallacy of the abstract universal which is common to all socialistic schemes.

Christianity takes the Platonic principle of subordination of lower to higher;

but it adds a new definition to what the higher or rather the highest is;

and it introduces a new appeal for the lowliest to become willing servants and friends of the highest, instead of mere constrained serfs and slaves (H 282-83).

[*Compare:* To the Christian every child is a child of God, every woman a sister of Christ, every man a son of the Father ... (H 283).]

Christianity finally gathers up into itself what ever is good in the principle of Aristotle.

The Aristotelian principle was the devotion of life to a worthy end and the selection of efficient means for its accomplishment (H 284).

74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY

74:11.25 The great truth which Plato taught was the subordination of the lower elements in human nature to the higher,

but in the practical application of this truth he all but failed.

His highest ideal was attainable by few men,

and then he proposed to enforce the mandates of reason "by fraud and intimidation of those incapable of comprehending their reasonableness."

Thus he was led to perpetrate that "fallacy of the abstract universal" which is so characteristic of all socialistic philosophies.

Christianity adopts the Platonic doctrine of subordination of the lower to the higher,

but it supplies a new reality as that higher, or rather the highest,

and presents a new appeal for the lowest—even the lowliest—to become, not merely voluntary servants and friends of the highest,

but actually to accept the status of Divine Sonship—to believe that they really are the "sons of God."

74:11.26 And Christianity does not fail to appropriate all of the good in the doctrines of Aristotle.

The Aristotelian principle was the dedication of life to a worthy end and the selection of the most efficient means for attaining that goal.

"To this end have I been born, and to this end am I come into the world," is Jesus' justification of His mission, when questioned by Pontius Pilate (H 284).

Such a concept of living is supremely revealed in Jesus' teachings.

And the philosophy of the Carpenter's Son embraces much more than is exhibited in institutionalized Christianity.

74:11.27 But I doubt that it is possible to undertake to utilize Jesus' philosophy of living as a personal credo without at the same time more or less accepting His doctrines of religious service, which were in His life so intimately associated with His amazing philosophy of living. In this connection be it clearly understood that, when I refer to religion and religious living, I mean something entirely different from adherence to some theological creed or attachment to some sectarian religious belief. In this connection my use of the term religion might be defined as consisting in a *bona fide personal spiritual experience*.

[Religious idealism not only inspires its followers to realize self on increasingly higher levels, but it also provides the most powerful of all centers for personality unification (*TPoP* 1088).]

74:11.28 Perhaps the greatest function of a personal religious experience is its unification of one's life experience.

It assists in developing a unified philosophy of living, and such a philosophy does much to enable man to adjust himself to the disagreeable situations and the horrific experiences of life.

74:11.29 Neuroticism, anxiety, depression, cynicism, nervous irritability are not able to fasten themselves upon a personality which is unified on the higher social and spiritual levels of self-realization. Cosmic realization, God-knowingness,

enables the individual to live tranquilly above the petty harassments of a purely pessimistic and materialistic existence.

[See endnote no. 1.]

74:11.30 No philosophy of life is worthy of the name unless it provides a spiritual tranquillity based on cosmic realization of selfhood, the unshakable belief that the universe is friendly to spirit-dominated sons. There is comfort and consolation in the realization that the universe is controlled by mind and dominated by spirit, and that these supreme values of infinity and eternity are not indifferent to man's temporal status and eternal welfare. A philosophy which is only cognizant of time and space is indeed primitive and humanistic. The human soul is elevated by every attempt to enhance its insight into the universe, to comprehend truth, to love beauty, and to worship goodness.

74:11.31 Worship in this philosophic sense transcends all the concepts of anthropomorphic religion and symbolizes the supreme attitude of the human spirit in its totality of personality adjustment to the concept of absolute reality. It connotes the acme of human self-realization and personality unification and would appear to be the goal of all adequate philosophies of moral living and spiritual striving. Men and women who truly worship, having in spirit identified themselves with absolute truth, are still practical in their determination to face reality. Such cosmic citizens are not guilty of stooping to dodge the demands, even the shadowy materialistic situations, of everyday life. Such citizens of the universe find it impossible to indulge in any sort of flight from reality. To them, self-realization has become synonymous with the realization of all genuine reality.

74:11.32 What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose a unified personality of survival value, a soul of united material and cosmic values? A man's personality consists, not in the abundance of things he possesses, but rather in the ennobled and liberated realization of high values and true meanings of spiritual unity and in the soul consciousness of the reality of the cosmic adventure in universe attainment, the striving for the realization of the infinite ideal of the Absolute.

74:11.33 The conflicts initiated by spiritual force are life-saving danger signals. They are far removed from the lower levels of the futile neurotic short-circuiting of energies of the egocentric personality. The person who suffers from spiritual conflict is seeking to realize self and unify his personality on superior levels of living. Spiritual comfort, "the peace that passes all understanding," is experienced only by those far-seeing individuals who choose to unify their personalities on the upper, unselfish, and more spiritual levels of self-realization. The consciousness of spiritual conflict represents the ennobling urge of man's better nature and is far removed from the enervating conflicts of animal fear and emotional turmoil. The consciousness of spiritual reality probably constitutes the ideal of sublimation.

[Compare 101:4 of the UB.]

74:11.34 In the struggle to evolve a philosophy of living, man strikes out in every direction in quest for values which will challenge and intrigue him. He grasps for personal comfort, strives for self-expression, aspires to attain his ideals; he even hopes for immortality.

IV: ROBERT ANDREWS MILLIKAN (Millikan, in *Living Philosophies* 37)

Fullness of knowledge always and necessarily means some understanding of the depths of our ignorance, and that is always conduce to both humility and reverence (M 50).

Says Millikan:

"Fullness of knowledge always and necessarily means some understanding of the depth of our ignorance, and that is always conducive to both humility and reverence."

Sooner or later most mortals acquire a faith which transcends the material world, and this concern about supermaterial realities is a sure indication of moral development and spiritual growth.

XX: BEATRICE WEBB (Webb, in *Living Philosophies* 295)

74:11.35 How many times I find my patients courageously struggling to live in accordance with the idealistic philosophy of Jesus, but, because of their unwillingness to subscribe to sectarian creeds, so often describing themselves as "religious outcasts."

[In conjunction with her husband (Lord Passfield) BEATRICE WEBB has written several stand books on sociological problems (*Living Philosophies* 333).]

Beatrice Webb, who collaborates with husband, Lord Passfield, in sociological writing,

Thus, like many of my contemporaries, I am a religious outcast;

has only recently described her plight in just such terms.

I cannot enjoy, without sacrificing intellectual integrity, the immeasurable benefit of spiritual comradeship, the inner peace arising out of traditional forms of worship, the inspiration of noble motive—all of which I recognize as embodied in the discipline of the great religions of the world, such as Christianity and Buddhism (W 304).

The disciplines of science have forced her out of orthodox religion, but she still clings to the concept of spiritual reality and seeks to realize these high values in her personal experience.

IV: ROBERT ANDREWS MILLIKAN (Millikan, in *Living Philosophies* 37)

74:11.36 On the other hand we have, in

[ROBERT ANDREW MILLIKAN was in 1923 awarded the Nobel Prize for isolating and measuring the electron (*Living Philosophies* 331).]

Professor Robert Millikan, the renowned physicist,

one who seeks to realize these high spiritual realities

I have myself belonged to two churches, one a Union church and one a Congregationalist church, both of which were unhampered by a creed of any sort (M 53).

while at the same time maintaining an organic connection with institutional religion.

There are three ideas which seem to me to stand out above all others in the influence they have exerted and are destined to exert upon the development of the human race.... They are the following:

He sums up his personal credo as consisting in

1. The idea of the Golden Rule;

the Golden Rule,

2. The idea of natural law;

the respect for natural law,

3. The idea of age-long growth, or evolution (M 37-38).

and the recognition of evolutionary progress.

12. Mixed Philosophies—Composite Credos

74:12.1 I venture the guess that about one-half of our psychiatric patients are struggling with the problem of trying to unify a mixed philosophy of living. In other words, their philosophy of life is still evolving; it is composite; it consists in a mosaic of various factors gleaned here and there from the outstanding philosophies already discussed, to which they have added various beliefs, sentiments, and convictions that have evolved as a part of their life experience.

74:12.2 And it must be recognized that such a composite philosophy of life is far better than none, for its devotees are much more efficient and happy than their fellow beings who entirely lack a credo for living.

VIII: THE PERSONALITY IN RELATION TO THE WORLD (Dorsey 283)

I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSONALITY (Dorsey 283)

Many a person would be a very well-balanced individual, indeed, if the only factor of balance were determined by the insight such a person has into his own self.

74:12.3 Many persons have a very well-balanced concept of their own status—insight respecting their own selves.[6]

In fact, many individuals who are misfits in life have relatively good insight into the nature of the self within them.

Many social and economic misfits have relatively good insight into the nature of self,

Their fault lies in the fact that they cannot apply this insight to the understanding of other people, which is one of the chief values of self-insight (D 283).

but they cannot adapt this insight to the understanding of others.

Thus they fail in its social utilization.

IV: MAN'S BIOLOGICAL BACK-GROUND (Dorsey 105)

II. PERSISTENT POWER OF THE BIOLOGIC PAST (Dorsey 109)

However, we must remember that we are more than merely animals who have learned to talk and to work together.

74:12.4 Man must ever remember that he is more than merely an educated or cultured animal that has learned some of the arts of civilization.

We have developed qualities peculiar to men, qualities which we share with no other living creature:

He exhibits characteristic human qualities, qualities which he shares with no existing animal.

the powers of *consciously* adapting ourselves to our environment, of *purposively* contributing to our evolution,

The power of *consciously* adapting oneself to environment—*purposively* contributing to one's evolution—

is exclusively human.

of desiring and visualizing a far-away goal and saying, "Thus—and so—we may reach it" (D 121).

No animal can choose some distant goal of life;

only man can have a philosophy of living.

X: HUMAN VALUES: WHAT TO EDUCATE FOR (Dorsey 395)

II. HAPPINESS (Dorsey 409)

The important facts to bear in mind are that all constitutions differ in varying degrees, that each constitution has different aspects within itself, and that each constitution strives momentarily for the expression of its immediate inner needs. Kant's orderly constitution expressed this belief:

74:12.5 *Kant* said:

"The greatest concern of man is to know how he can best fulfill his place in creation, and to understand what he must be in order to be a man."

"The greatest concern of man is to know how can best fulfill his place in creation, and to understand what he must do in order to be a man."

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
We have too the mandate of Pindar:	Said *Pindar,*
“Become, what thou art!—	“Become what thou art!”
	and, as someone has remarked,
only another way of saying,	this is only another way of saying,
“Develop your personality! Complete yourself!” (D 413-14)	“Develop your personality! Complete yourself.”
	74:12.6 The professional philosophers dislike to discuss these mosaic philosophies of living; they prefer to envisage clear-cut concepts of philosophic thought. Nevertheless, they admit that such composite credos, notwithstanding their inconsistencies, are of practical value for many people.
	After all, there is something to be said in favor of these “mixed philosophies”—they help in preventing the development of fixed and rigid technics of thinking—they afford a refreshing differentiation of viewpoints and thereby conduce to progressive development.
	74:12.7 A perusal of the personal confessions of modern philosophers can but lead to the recognition of the fact that many of our great thinkers do not have a very well-defined personal credo for living. To say the least, many of them are suffering from a failure of personal unification.
“THE PHILOSOPHY OF A MELIORIST,” by Durant Drake (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I* 275)	
[contd] Born 1878; Professor of Philosophy, Vassar College (D 275).	*Drake,* of Vassar,

The Philosophy of Reformer, I thought of calling it (D 277).

pleads guilty of being a "reformer."

"PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERALISM," by C. J. Ducasse, (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I* 299)

[contd] Born 1881; Professor of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, R.I. (D 299).

Ducasse, of Brown University,

confesses to being a "liberalist,"

"THE WAY OF OPINION," by Theodore De Laguna, (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. I* 401)

[contd] Born 1876; Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College, Penn. (D 401).

while Theodore *De Laguna,* of Bryn Mawr,

It happens that my own thought during this last quarter-century has belonged to the fringe and not the centre of American philosophy; and its general tendency has been in the direction of a more and more radical scepticism (DeL 403).

says he is a "radical skeptic."

"THE PHILOSOPHICAL *CREDO* OF AN ABSOLUTISTIC PERSONALIST," by Mary Whiton Calkins, (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 1* 199)

[contd] Born 1863; Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass. (C 199).

74:12.8 Professor Mary *Calkins,* of Wellesley,

I am eager to point out that ... I associate myself with metaphysicians of many points of view, not merely with out-and-out idealists, such as Berkeley, Hume, Hegel, Royce, and Pearson ... but with dualists, classic and contemporary, of many sorts, ... in a word, with philosophers of every type who assert or admit the existence of mental entities or qualities (C 200).

claims to be an idealist,

but she would hardly fit into any of the modern classifications of idealism.

Perhaps she had better be regarded as an "absolutistic personalist."

My philosophic *credo* is made up of four articles.

She summarizes her personal credo as including the beliefs that:

The first of these may thus be stated: The universe contains distinctively mental realities; it may or may not also contain non-mental entities, but in any case irreducibly mental realities exist (C 200).

74:12.9 1. The universe contains bona fide mental realities.

The second article of my philosophic creed ... embodies the conviction that mental realities are ultimately personal, that the mental phenomena which I directly observe are not percepts, thought, emotions, and volitions, in unending succession, but rather perceiving, thinking, feeling, and willing self or selves (C 201).

74:12.10 2. Mental realities are ultimately personal.

[M]y philosophy is, in the third place, unambiguously idealistic, that is mentalistic (C 203).

74:12.11 3. The universe is idealistically mentalistic.

(1) The culminating article of my philosophical *credo* is embodied in the assertion that the universe literally is one all-including (and accordingly complete) self of which all the lesser selves are genuine and identical parts, or members (C 209).

74:12.12 4. Universe reality consists in an all-including self.

Hegel and Bradley and my great teacher, Josiah Royce, are the personal absolutists who have influenced me most (C 212, fn).

74:12.13 While Hegel, Bradley, and Royce might be regarded as being personal absolutists,

[See 74:12.8, above.]

it would seem that Calkins has appropriated idealistic concepts from Berkeley, Royce, Pearson, and others

I am well aware that most present-day philosophers ... cry down this absolutistic argument as abstract speculation or futile 'logic-chopping.' But contemporary *Gestalt*-theory seems to have made this cavalier dismissal of the doctrine impossible ... In a word, the *Gestalt* is precisely the 'including whole' of the absolutist; and the Absolute is no more nor less than the supreme *Gestalt* (C 211).

and at the same time confesses to absolutistic leanings which are akin to a sort of supergestaltism.

74:12.14 As I study the writings of some of my contemporaries, it appears to me that many of them are driving on through life with their philosophies of living far from being unified.

I: THE EPICUREAN PURSUIT OF PLEASURE (Hyde 1)

VI. CONFESSIONS OF AN EPICUREAN HERETIC (Hyde 53)

Like the Christian church, the Epicurean school has been blessed with numerous progeny of this disturbing sort. The one among them all who most stoutly professes the fundamental principles of Epicureanism, and then proceeds to admit pretty much everything its opponents advance against it,

74:12.15 A good illustration of lack of philosophic unification or of the handicap of working under a composite philosophy of living,

is John Stuart Mill.

is the case of John Stuart *Mill.*

His "Utilitarianism"

He propounds a "utilitarianism"

which someone has well designated as

is a fort manned with the most approved idealistic guns, yet with the Epicurean flag floating bravely over the whole.

"a fort manned with the most approved idealistic guns, yet with the Epicurean flag gloating bravely over the whole."

He is an Epicurean who has strayed far away from its tents of faith.

He "holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness..." (H 54).

He holds that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."

... Mill's confession that he cares for the height and dignity of the faculties employed rather than the quantity of pleasure gained

But when Mill seeks to qualify his Epicurean faith by teaching that high and dignified levels of activity should be employed in the attainment of pleasure,

lifts him out of the Epicurean school to which he professes adherence and makes him an idealist (H 58).

he goes a long way toward becoming an idealist;

[contd] When asked for an explanation of his preference of higher to lower,

and when he seeks to validate his preference for things higher over those that are lower,

Mill at once shifts to Stoic ground in the following sentences: "We may ... refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; ... but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity ..." (H 58).

he comes very close to expounding Platonic philosophy.

At other times he is definitely Stoic.

74:12.16 Mill's philosophy goes on through the concept of the Greeks and the Romans,

Lastly Mill introduces his Christian ideal.

and it actually concludes with a frank recognition of Christian idealism.

" ... In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as one's self, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality (H 63).

He says: "In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by and to love one's neighbor as one's self, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."

prag´ma·tism ... **2**. *Philos.* Emphasis upon the application of ideas or the practical bearings of conceptions and beliefs; specif., the American movement in philosophy founded by C. S. Peirce and William James

74:12.17 *Pragmatism* is an American school of philosophy founded by William James

and continued by John Dewey and his followers.

and perpetuated by John Dewey,

Characteristic doctrines of this movement are that the meaning of conceptions is to be sought in their practical bearings,

which maintains that the meanings of conceptions are to be found in their practical bearings;

that the function of thought is as a guide to action,

the function of thought is as a guide to action.

and that truth is pre-eminently to be tested by the practical consequences of belief (*Webster's* 1938).

Truth is preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences of belief.

I believe that most pragmatists are struggling along with a more or less composite philosophy of living.

III: JOHN DEWEY (Dewey, *Living Philosophies* 21)

[*Note:* Here Sadler draws from Dewey's essay in *Living Philosophies,* apparently forgetting that he had already discussed Dewey in 74:6.6, in connection with Dewey's other essay in *Contemporary American Philosophy*.]

74:12.18 *Dewey* at the bottom is a pragmatist.

Faith in its newer sense signifies that experience itself is the sole ultimate authority (D 21).

To him faith signifies that experience itself is the sole and ultimate authority,

The method we term "scientific" forms for the modern man ... the sole dependable means of disclosing the realities of existence.... This possession of a new method, to the use of which no limits can be put, signifies a new idea of the nature and possibilities of experience (D 24).

and of course such concepts connote new ideas of nature and ultimate possibilities of human experience;

but who can read Dewey's writings without, on the one hand, detecting the Aristotelian birthmarks and, on the other, discovering trends of altruism and even idealism.

I: ALBERT EINSTEIN (Einstein, *Living Philosophies* 3)

[ALBERT EINSTEIN, winner of the Nobel Prize and author of the Theory of Relativity, is generally regarded as the world's most distinguished living scientist (*Living Philosophies* 331).]

74:12.19 Albert *Einstein,* author of the theory of relativity and regarded by many as the world's most distinguished scientist,

is likewise a victim of an un-unified philosophy. Is he humanist, optimist, or materialist?

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
I do not believe that we can have any freedom at all in the philosophic sense,	He frankly says that he doubts that we can have any freedom at all in the philosophic sense,
for we act not only under external compulsion but also by inner necessity.	"for we act not only under external compulsion but also by inner necessity."
	And in further explanation of his attitude he quotes approvingly
Schopenhauer's saying—"A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills—impressed itself upon me in youth and has always consoled me when I have witnessed or suffered life's hardships (E 3-4).	Schopenhauer's saying, "Man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills."
To ponder interminably over the reason for one's own existence or the meaning of life in general seems to me, from an objective point of view, to be sheer folly.	Einstein deems it futile to give too much thought to the meaning of life,
And yet everyone holds certain ideals by which he guides his aspiration and his judgment.	and yet he recognizes the experiential reality of ideals as inspirational guides.
	In summing up the spirit of his credo, he says:
The ideals which have always shone before me and filled me with the joy of living are goodness, beauty, and truth.	"The ideals which have always shone before me and filled me with the joy of living are goodness, beauty, and truth.
To make a goal of comfort or happiness has never appealed to me; a system of ethics built on this basis would be sufficient only for a herd of cattle (E 4).	To make a goal of comfort or happiness has never appealed to me; a system of ethics built on this basis would be sufficient only for a herd of cattle."
VI: H. G. WELLS (Wells, in *Living Philosophies* 79)	
	74:12.20 I think in H. G. *Wells* we discover another brave soul who struggles on with an evolving philosophy of living.

Orthodox Christianity insists that we are ourselves forever and forever.... My credo is much nearer Stoicism. It is, indeed, Stoicism in the light of modern biological science.

He mildly professes to be a Stoic,

I do not believe in the least that either the body of H. G. Wells or his personality is immortal, but I do believe that the growing process of thought, knowledge, and will of which we are parts, of which I am a part, and of which you are a part, may go on growing in range and power forever. I think that Man is immortal, but not men (W 89).

but there is too much that is composite and progressive in his philosophy to warrant our leaving him in that category.

He allows for altogether too much of expression for one's individuality and personal trends. Wells is too much interested in the human race in particular and in the universe in general to be an orthodox Stoic. He reaches out, perhaps unconsciously, on the one hand, for optimism and, on the other, toward idealism, and these trends have undoubtedly served to render his philosophy of life much more helpful and endurable.

XVIII: IRWIN EDMAN (Edman, in *Living Philosophies* 277)

74:12.21 A professor of philosophy in one of our leading universities frankly professes that

Besides God and immortality, traditional religion has promised us, or presumes to have, freedom. In a certain rough sense I suppose I believe in determinism.

he is a determinist

[*Compare:* Meanwhile life seems to me, for all its eternal and contemporary limitations, good fun—and possibly much more. At the very least it provokes merriment and ... it may still be the incitement to beauty and wisdom as well (E 286).]

with strong leaning toward Hedonism,

but that his philosophy of life is still evolving and is more or less composite is shown by the fact that, immediately after making such a materialistic confession of faith, he says:

But practically and morally I believe in freedom. That is, within the limits of natural conditions, I believe genuine choice is possible, and that choice is immensely enlarged by education and the habit and technique of understanding (E 285).

"But practically and morally I believe in freedom. That is, within the limits of natural conditions, I believe genuine choice is possible, and that choice is immensely enlarged by education and the habit and technic of understanding."

II: BERTRAND RUSSELL (Russell, in *Living Philosophies* 9)

74:12.22 But the composite philosophy of

[BERTRAND RUSSELL is known on two continents as mathematician, educator and philosopher. Some of his better-known books are *Education and the Good Life, Marriage and Morals,* and *Philosophy (Living Philosophies* 331).]

Bertrand *Russell,* mathematician and educator,

is difficult to envisage.

This dilemma probably grows out of the fact that, as he confesses, in his earlier years he traversed many philosophic domains—

[As a teenager] I had never heard of Cartesianism, or indeed, of any of the great philosophies, but my thoughts ran spontaneously on Cartesian lines (R 10).

Cartesian,

I studied philosophy [at Cambridge University] and under the influence of McTaggart became for a time a Hegelian. This phase lasted about three years and was brought to an end by discussions with G. E. Moore (R 11).

Hegelian, and so on,

[*Note:* Russell's essay expresses nothing in the way of determinism or fatalism; it advocates pacifism, an international government and the bringing up of individuals to be less prone to hatred and fear. Sadler was probably thinking of Russell's 1903 essay, "A Free Man's Worship," which was paraphrased in 102:01 of the Urantia Book. Durant, in his The Story of Philosophy, mentions how Russell's philosophy changed during World War I. See pp. 523-526.]

and he seems to have wound up as something of pragmatic deterministic fatalist.

From the standpoint of the idealist, at least, his credo resembles a gospel of despair.

XIV: LEWIS MUMFORD (Mumford, in *Living Philosophies* 205)

But still more typical of the composite philosophy of living is that of

[LEWIS MUMFORD, one of the keenest of the younger American critics, is equally well-known as essayist, social historian and architectural authority. Among his books are *Sticks and Stones, The Golden Day* and *Herman Melville* (*Living Philosophies* 333.]

Lewis *Mumford,* the critic and social historian.

[*Note:* Sadler's description doesn't reflect Mumford's essay; Mumford mentions nothing about the Stoics or Aristotle, nor are his views similar to theirs. He describes his "fundamental political faith" as "corresponding roughly to Plato's."]

He gleans from the Stoics, from Aristotle, and then from among the modernists he ranges from humanism up to what I would call cosmic citizenship.

There would seem to be but one further step for this essayist to take, and that would be to unify this mosaic credo into the transcendental spiritual teachings of Jesus.

13. Negativistic Philosophies

74:13.1 While I recognize more or less of value in the negativistic philosophies from the standpoint of unifying personality and serving as a motivating personal credo for living, nevertheless, these schools of philosophy are less valuable as auxiliaries in psychiatric practice. Although a philosophic unification of personality on any level, even on a regressive one, is a fundamental aid in psychiatric treatment, I firmly believe that the positive philosophies are far more efficacious, not to say ideal.

74:13.2 The negativistic philosophies will be considered under six heads:

[See 74:0.68, above.]

74:13.3 1. **Pessimism.**—Our pessimistic friends are given to overmagnification of evil and to that melancholy belief that the evil in life is preponderant over the good. They look upon the dark side of every human proposition, and they have little faith in the future of social evolution.

V: THEODORE DREISER (Dreiser, in *Living Philosophies* 55)

I presume our best-known contemporary pessimist is Theodore Dreiser,

[THEODORE DREISER'S best-known novels include *An American Tragedy, Sister Carrie, The Titan, The Financier,* and *The "Genius"* (*Living Philosophies* 331).]

the novelist and writer,

And yet, in the face of all this, I would not like to write myself down as a total pessimist.... Rather, the best I can say is that I have not the faintest notion of what it is all about, unless it is for self-satisfaction in many and varied ways—all more or less achieved by cruelty or greed ... (D 66).

and he seems to be a consistent pessimist.

There is little from other schools of philosophy in his credo.

VII: SCHOPENHAUER (Durant 326)

[contd] Why did the first half of the nineteenth century life up, as voices of the age, a group of pessimistic poets ...; a group of pessimistic composers ...; and above all, a profoundly pessimistic philosopher—Arthur Schopenhauer? (D 326)

74:13.4 Schopenhauer is undoubtedly the outstanding pessimistic philosopher,

and we should always remember that

There is, of course, a large element of egotism in pessimism:

there is undoubtedly a large element of egotism in all pessimism.

the world is not good enough for us (D 374).

The pessimist just does not believe the world is good enough for him.

74:13.5 2. **Cynicism.**—

V: VOLTAIRE AND THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT (Durant 218)

[?]

Voltaire is probably the best known cynic,

[*Compare:* Never was pessimism so gaily argued [as in Voltaire's *Candide*]; never was man made to laugh so heartily while learning that this is a world of woe (D 248).]

and the cynical group undoubtedly represents the better level of pessimism.

[See 74:0.69, above.]

Our cynical friends believe that all human conduct is selfishly motivated, and they look with suspicion upon the purpose underlying all altruism and benevolence.

74:13.6 3. **Fatalism.**— Fatalists follow a philosophy still more melancholic than pessimism.

[See 74:0.70 and 74:0.71, above.]

This philosophy relegates man to the realm of automatism and implies that all his acts are irretrievably predetermined. However, it must be said that many scientific determinists recognize a certain sort of freewill in the sense that, even though the acts of supposed volition are cosmically predetermined, they are at the same time *uncompelled.*

74:13.7 4. **Determinism.**—The philosophy of determinism, of one type or another, is espoused by very many present-day scientists, but it seems to me there is a steady movement in scientific circles away from mechanism and determinism.

VII: FRIDTJOF NANSEN (Nansen, in *Living Philosophies* 93)

Perhaps one of the most outstanding of fatalistic determinists is the late Fridtjof *Nansen.*

[FRIDTJOF NANSEN died in 1930. Known widely as Norwegian explorer, scholar and diplomat, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1922 (*Living Philosophies* 332).]

This intrepid explorer

[*Note:* Nansen mentions nothing about Voltaire.]

was not satisfied with the pessimism of Voltaire

When Charles Darwin was asked about his faith, he answered: " ... I think that generally (and more and more as I grow older), but not always, an Agnostic would be the more correct description of my state of mind" (N 93).

nor the agnosticism of Charles Darwin.

He drifted on into a mixed philosophy of living whose dominant note was clearly fatalistic.

He comforted himself with the thought of racial immortality and declared his faith to be

For numbers of people it may be a consolation to think that the soul is immortal, and that there is a life after this where there may be some compensation for the sufferings and shortcomings of this earthly existence; but certainly it is a less selfish, nobler, and a more wholesome faith to believe that our life is *here* and *now*, that we are passing links the continuous chain from the past to the future,

the "belief that our life is *here and now,* that we are passing links in the continuous chain from the past to the future,

and that we survive only in the effects of our thoughts and acts, and in our descendants, and therefore that we have to do our very best in this one life... (N 98).

and that we survive only in the effects of our thoughts and acts and in our descendants."

74:13.8 5. **Mechanism.**—A quarter of a century ago the majority of scientists in the English-speaking world were, to say the least, mechanists, and many of them are yet, though some of the more philosophic minded are gradually drifting away from their adherence to the more highly mechanistic concept of life and reality.

[See 74:0.72, above.]

Our mechanist friends believe that the laws of physics and chemistry are capable of explaining all natural processes, including human experience.

SOURCE	74: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
[*Note:* This remark is a complete non sequitur. Perhaps it was meant for 74:6.]	There is a school of realists who modify this theory by teaching that universal realities enjoy a bona fide existence separate and apart from recognition by the human mind through the channels of sense perception.
X: SIR ARTHUR KEITH (Keith, in *Living Philosophies* 139)	
	74:13.9 One of the most outstanding mechanists is Sir Arthur *Keith,*
[SIR ARTHUR KEITH, famous for his researches in the antiquity of man, was in 1927 President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. He is Hunterian Professor in the Royal College of Surgeons, London (*Living Philosophies* 332).]	professor at the Royal College of Surgeons, London.
The natural span of man's existence contains enough to make this life a prize worth living.	He believes that man should be satisfied with what he has in his one life in the flesh,
That longing, which lies at the very root of the Christian religion, I look upon as a sin of the flesh—	and he regards the craving for immortality as the outstanding "sin of the flesh,"
one to be conquered and suppressed.	one that we should endeavor completely to conquer.
It is a vice akin to avarice (K 151).	He classifies the longing for survival along with avarice,
I cannot help feeling that the darkness in which the final secret of the universe lies hid is part of the Great Design.... The ultimate reason for man's existence is the only fruit in the garden of life which he can never hope to pluck.	
Clearly, then, my creed is imperfect. It is not final. No creed is final. Such a creed as mine must grow and change as knowledge grows and changes (K 151).	but his credo is, as he himself confesses, not complete, hardly final;

if a sufficient number of years are vouchsafed this great scientist, it is to be hoped that his philosophy will recover from this stark mechanistic realism and take unto itself some of the more cheerful and reassuring aspects of the more positivistic philosophies of living.

74:13.20 *Behaviorism* is just such a school of mechanistic-materialistic psychology-philosophy.

[See 74:0.73, above.]

74:13.21 **6. Materialism.**—The theory that matter is the only ultimate reality. Mind is but the functioning of the physical brain.

Many materialists prefer to identify themselves with

naturalism = (*metaph.*) The theory that nature as the totality of spatio-temporal objects is the only reality (*DoP* 176).

naturalism—the theory that nature as the totality of spatio-temporal objects is the only reality.

"CONFESSIONS OF AN ANIMISTIC MATERIALIST," by Wm. Pepperell Montague (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 2* 133)

[contd] Born 1873; Professor of Philosophy, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York (M 133).

74:13.22 Professor William P. Montague, of Barnard College, Columbia University,

confesses to being an animistic materialist,

"THE FAITH OF A LOGICIAN," by Morris R. Cohen (in *Contemporary American Philosophy, Vol. 1* 219)

[contd] Born 1880; Professor of Philosophy, College of the City of New York. 219

while Professor *Cohen,* of the College of the City of New York,

If, then, the rejection of the belief in ghosts or disembodied spirits be materialism, I should call myself a materialist like Democritus, Hobbes, and Spinoza (C 238).

prefers to be called a materialist on the order of Hobbs and Spinoza.

I do not like to call myself an atheist, because those who apply that term to themselves seem as a rule singularly blind to the limitations of our knowledge and to the infinite possibilities beyond us.

He dislikes the term atheist

As a pluralist I believe that the forces which control all things are ultimately many; and if I could use to the term polytheism without implying that these forces are exclusively personal I should call myself a polytheist (C 246).

and says he would rather be called "polytheist."

[Source for sections of Papers 12 and 15, not used in this chapter.]

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[Baillie's *The Interpretation of Religion* was used in Papers 101, 102 and 103.]

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[Jeans is a prominent source for several science sections in the UB; Millikan is a source for a section in Paper 58.]

Living Philosophies (Einstein, Jeans, Dreiser, Adams, Keith, Webb, Nansen, Millikan, Belloc, Nathan, Russell, Dewey, Wells, Mencken, Peterkin, Babbitt, Krutch, Mumford, Hu Shin, Haldane, Edman, Inge), Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1933. ✔

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1. From Coffin's "An Adequate Philosophy of Life" (in Chapter X: Education), which was Sadler's apparent source for the idea of the necessity of developing a philosophy of life:

> But there is one thing more that must be said by way of characterization of the educated individual, namely, that he has arrived at an adequate philosophy of life. Reference was made in the opening pages of this book to the fact that most people doubtless have some sort of life philosophy, but the trouble is these philosophies are too often inadequate, partial, and inconsistent, not to say cynical and pessimistic. But we cannot insist too strongly upon the necessity of an individual's arriving at a point of view that shall include in its vista all the phases of the world and all the facts and values of experience. It is a fact, a most deplorable fact, that our colleges and universities themselves have contributed directly in a measurable degree to the partialness of the education of many supposedly educated people, because in their classrooms and laboratories it is not good form to mention religion or religious values....
>
> Under the circumstances, therefore, it is an impertinence to apologize for insisting upon the fact that, if education is to be complete, it must be spiritual education. And I come back to the proposition that education demands an adequate philosophy of life with the intention of emphasizing specifically the paramount place which one's spiritual outlook on life has, as an integral part of that which we are pleased to call one's education.
>
> Just what your philosophy of life must be, I cannot dictate, and neither can any one else, and neither can any one else. It must be the deliverance of your own interpretation and appreciation. But if it is to take account of all the facts and values of life it seems to me it must include at least the following propositions as its foundation:
>
> > That the world in which we live is not capricious, but lawful and orderly.
> > That it is not impersonal and malevolent, but beneficent.
> > That the universe is not a blind machine, but a place of purpose and beauty, man's home in which are all the elements for his happiness.
> > That if the world seems a hard place, it is because men make it so.
> > That man is not an accident or an incident on a molecule of star dust, but the final term in the mighty creative process, made in the image of God Himself.
> > That he has with his self-conscious mind the capacity to understand his world, appreciate its beauty, and participate with its Creator in its further development.
> > That no social system is right which does not nurture personality in all, and that the "power that makes for righteousness" is against a system that does not foster personality.

> That human suffering *en masse* is unnecessary, and that human society can be reconstructed so as to become a kingdom of heaven on earth.
> That the supreme achievement of personality is to put one's self in conscious harmony with the Will that governs the universe; and that this is happiness.

Such a philosophy of life issues in nothing more nor less than a vital and dynamic Faith... (C 241-43).

2. During the course of the Middle Ages it was, I believe, commonly assumed that man is an animal plus (Krutch, in *Living Philosophies* 265).

3. *Compare:* Schopenhauer's saying—"A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills"—impressed itself upon me in youth and has always consoled me when I have witnessed or suffered life's hardships. This conviction is a perpetual breeder of tolerance, for it does not allow us to take ourselves or others too seriously; it makes rather for a sense of humor (Einstein, in *Living Philosophies* 3-4).

4. Sadler may have been alluding to UB source author Sir James Jeans's theory that the universe was expanding, not because of a big bang but because of what the Urantia Book calls "space respiration" (see 11:6). Jeans wrote:

> Thus there are two possible explanations of the motions of the nebulae ... When we compare the nebulae to the fragments of a burst shell, we imagine the nebulae to be moving *through* space. But when we compare them to straws floating in a river, the river must be space itself; the nebulae are not moving *through* space, but *with* space—they are straws shewing us in what way the currents of space are flowing, and the law that speed is proportional to distance suggests that space is expanding uniformly.
>
> Probably the latter explanation is the best, because we now think that space is curved, and round, and finite in amount—rather like the surface of a balloon. Space is not to be compared to the air inside the balloon, but to the rubber which forms its surface (Sir James Jeans, *Through Space & Time* [1934], p. 215).

5. The words 'cosmic citizen(s)' and 'cosmic citizenship' appear several times in the Urantia Book. I wondered whether Sadler coined them, but I've found a few examples predating 1955:

From *Constructive Citizenship* (1930), by L.P. Jacks:

> The rights and duties of citizenship present themselves, as I conceive the matter, under three main aspects, political, industrial, and cosmic... (p. 197).
>
> . . . I venture here a further remark on the topic just touched upon—our cosmic citizenship (p. 197).

From *The Christian Leader, Vol. 34, Part 1* (1931):

> Why not be cosmic citizens in all the majestic adventure of faith? (p. 241)

From "Instinct, Reason and Intuition," by Axel Emil Gibson, in *Mind* (July 1904):

> The individual must surround himself with ideals of highest purity, and in his daily life try to realize himself as a cosmic citizen, constantly actuated by principles and motives of universal bearing (p. 291).

6. This passage is a complete non-sequitur.